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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper endeavors to give a systematic account of the role of civil 
society organizations (“CSOs”) in administrative governance. In most 
jurisdictions, “civil society” is not a legal term of art. It does exist, however, 
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and it does raise legal questions.1 The different kinds of roles played by 
CSOs in both policy formulation and policy delivery will be examined, as 
well as the legal questions raised by the involvement of CSOs in governance. 
It is admitted that some of these roles—including roles implicating 
the right of access to information or participation in administrative 
proceedings—are not exclusively roles played by CSOs, in that individuals 
and businesses might be involved as well. The involvement of our 
organizations, however, gives rise to specific questions, including questions 
of legitimacy and accountability, and this is especially true when 
participation in decision-making procedures is concerned. Governance itself 
is not a term of legal art, and it is frequently used by social scientists willing 
to break free from the perceived formalism of legal thinking and analysis.2  
What, then, is the role of law in this area? This paper strives to set 
out how the problems linked with involvement of the civil society in policy 
formulation and delivery can be systematically reconstructed and understood. 
Solutions to those problems will be then sought—if deduced is thought to be 
a too strong word—from their systematic understanding. Instances of actual 
legislation or case law are helpful in illustrating a problem and its possible 
solutions, and they will often be referred to herein. 
Finally, this paper has been drafted from a European—and, more 
specifically, an E.U.—perspective. Materials and ideas from other 
jurisdictions, and most notably the U.S., will however be referred to from 
time to time, in order to provide a contrast. 
 
II.  THE EUROPEAN CONTINENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: 
A (TOO) SHORT HISTORY 
 
The institutional model that followed the French Revolution is 
bipolar to the extremes:  on the one hand, you have the citizens, on the other 
hand, the State. True, in principle, the people have become the new 
sovereign after the monarchy was disposed of. However, the “people” is a 
theoretical construct going beyond the sum of the citizens taken as 
                                                 
1  See generally Kenneth Anderson, ‘Accountability’ as ‘Legitimacy’:  Global 
Governance, Global Civil Society and the United Nations, 36 BROOK J. INT’L L. 841, 865 
(2011) (providing a useful discussion and references to the idea of “civil society”). 
 2  It has been argued that: 
[T]he basic idea [referred to when talking of “governance”] is that 
government, identified with the traditional hierarchical state form, has 
given way to a world of diffused authority in which the boundaries 
between public law and private law are blurred. Governance seems to 
refer to the regulatory capacity of the whole gamut of organisations in the 
public sphere, including governments at all levels, private firms, and 
associations. 
Michael Keating, Europe’s Changing Political Landscape:  Territorial Restructuring and 
New Forms of Government, in CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE IN EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 3, 
13 (Paul Beaumont et al. eds., Hart 2002). 
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individuals. It is often translated in a mystical entity:  the Nation. It is the 
Nation to be vested with sovereign powers. Under Article 3 of the 1789 
Déclaration des droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen, which, by the way, is still 
part of the French national compact, “Le principe de toute souveraineté 
réside essentiellement dans la Nation. Nul corps, nul individu ne peut 
exercer d’autorité qui n’en émane expressément.”  
As already remarked, the “Nation” is more an idea than an actual 
occurrence. It must be translated in institutions which are actually exercising 
sovereign powers, such as an assemblée nationale (a one-chamber 
Parliament). These institutions are in turn different emanations—in legal 
jargon, different organs—of another theoretical construct:  the “State.” 
Differently from the Nation, the State is articulated in institutions which 
actually are given a number of powers over the society at large and its 
members. 
The citizens could be seen as evaporating from abstraction (the 
Nation) to abstraction (the State), the latter, however, being capable of 
materializing itself through its different organs. In the end, the citizens vote; 
beyond this, they are not usually involved directly in government choices, 
unless these choices affect their rights and freedoms. In the latter case, the 
citizen is not seen as the holder of a particle of sovereignty. He or she is 
rather at the receiving end of the choices made by the State in the name of 
the people or the Nation. 
Indeed the State is also the only representative of those interests 
which are thought to be general in a given society. More than this, it is the 
State, through its (possibly democratically representative) organs, that is 
charged with selecting those interests which are deemed to be general. 
General interests are selected through legislation, which provides a measure 
of security for individuals, in that the statutes define the limits and conditions 
of authoritative powers.3 
Once an interest is thus selected, the State is supposed to tend to its 
satisfaction. For instance, when the provision of a service to the general 
public is in the general interest, the State is to make sure that the service is 
provided according to what is now termed the universal service principle.  
Because these interests are general, supposed to be common to the 
entire Nation, they override individual interests. The French have this 
wonderful opposition between intérêt général and intérêt particulier, which 
immediately conveys the feeling that the latter must be less relevant than the 
former. The whole is always more relevant than its parts. That is why 
“citizen” is more used in constitutional law then in administrative law. In 
administrative law, the more anodyne “individual” is often used, and closer 
to the French idea of particulier. The particulier must therefore be ready to 
                                                 
 3  See Matthias Ruffert, The Transformation of Administrative Law as a 
Transnational Methodological Project, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN 
EUROPE 3, 10 (Matthias Ruffert ed., 2007). 
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see his or her rights and freedoms encroached upon and at times forfeited in 
the general interest. 
It goes without saying that the general interest is also intended to 
override the interest of firms or corporations (undertakings, in the language 
of the E.U.), which in the end are the emanation of some individuals’ 
freedom (the freedom to undertake an economic activity through a corporate 
structure). 
The motore immobile being legislation, public servants tend to be 
individuals with legal training. Quite to the point, Max Weber characterized 
this administration as legal-rational.4 As it has been remarked, “In essence, 
Weber identified administrative, or bureaucratic government, as a rational-
legal regime in which groups of full-time, salaried officials, chosen on the 
basis of their credentials and placed within hierarchical organizations, 
conduct official business according to established rules, within a defined 
jurisdiction, and for defined instrumental purposes.”5  
A special knowledge therefore sets the bureaucrats apart from the 
rest of society and is the reason for their special powers.6 This of course 
creates the perfect environment for a very top-down, hierarchical and often 
centralized approach to governance and administration. The relationship 
between the State and the citizen is not only bipolar, it is very much vertical. 
Maurice Hauriou in France centered his description of administrative law on 
the idea of puissance publique (public power) and on derogations to the law 
as between private individuals, which were the result of the overriding 
powers of the administration. Similarly, in Germany, Otto Mayer stressed the 
                                                 
 4  See, e.g., Jens-Peter Schneider, The Public-Private Law Divide in Germany, in 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN EUROPE 85, 89 (Matthias Ruffert ed., 
2007). 
 5  Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act 
Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 99 (2003). 
 6  See Fabio Rugge, Administrative Traditions in Western Europe, in HANDBOOK 
OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 177, 178 (B. Guy Peters & Jon Pierre eds., Sage 2003). 
During the eighteenth century, as the state became increasingly 
de-personalized and the scope of its action came to coincide, at least 
ideally, with the common welfare, the crown’s servants were gradually 
replaced by the state’s servants, whose personal dependence on the 
sovereign was coupled with—although rarely replaced by—an 
institutional relation to the state. Real administrative apparatuses 
developed and their activities and proper functioning became the subject 
of a large number of writings, soon to amalgamate into a body of 
knowledge defined as the administrative science(s). Notwithstanding all 
this restructuring, the “kingly administrations” were not superseded until 
the beginning of the nineteenth century. Up to this time, monarchs largely 
retained their powers in shaping states’ administrative structures, in 
controlling their action, in appointing their personnel. 
Id.; see also Francesca Bignami, From Expert Administration to Accountability Network:  A 
New Paradigm for Comparative Administrative Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 859, 863 (2011). 
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rechtlischen Ungleichheit (legal disparity) between State and subject.7 The 
fact that the word “subject” was used instead of “citizen” is by itself of 
obvious significance.8 
True, in France, Hauriou had a formidable opponent in Léon Duguit, 
who with the theory of the service public meant to cast administrative action 
as an instrument for caring after the needs of the people, rather than an 
exercise of authority.9 What could be considered a legal theory of the welfare 
State, however, failed to command following in most European countries, 
where the top-down character of administrative law was much exalted.10 
In Continental Europe, these vertical relations came to be 
crystallized by the idea of the unilateral biding administrative decision. This 
concept, which remains somewhat alien to English administrative law, was 
and is central on the other side of the Channel. Referring to Germany, it has 
been remarked that: 
 
[L]ike legislation and jurisdiction, administration, too, had 
its own decision-making functions and the Verwaltungsakt 
was vested with the task of declaring the law in concrete, 
individual case . . . . Running along the same line of 
reasoning, French and Italian legal doctrine has identified 
those particular administrative decision-making functions 
through which imperium was exercised (décisions 
administratives, provvedimenti amministrativi), thereby 
limiting rights and liberties. This expressed the supremacy 
of the administration vis-à-vis private citizens, in the sense 
that the former declares what the law is for the latter, instead 
of being placed under the same legal rules.11 
 
As it has been exactly remarked, “The administrative act was 
theoretically important because it represented the moment at which the law 
                                                 
 7  See Bernardo Giorgio Mattarella, Il rapporto autorità-libertà e il diritto 
amministrativo europeo, in RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DIRITTO PUBBLICO 909, 910 (2006) 
(referencing the Italian experience); Bernardo Sordi, Il principio di legalità nel diritto 
amministrativo che cambia. La prospettiva storica, in DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO:  RIVISTA 
TRIMESTRALE 1, 15 (2008). 
 8  See Jos C.N. Raadschelders, Administrative History, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION 161, 164 (B. Guy Peters & Jon Pierre eds., Sage 2003). 
 9  Etienne Picard, The Public-Private Divide in French Law Through the History 
and Destiny of French Administrative Law, in THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE:  POTENTIAL FOR 
TRANSFORMATION? 17, 53 (Matthias Ruffert ed., BIICL 2009). 
 10  See also Bignami, supra note 6, at 864; Roberto Caranta, The Fall from 
Fundamentalism in Italian Administrative Law, in THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE:  POTENTIAL 
FOR TRANSFORMATION? 99, 99 (Matthias Ruffert ed., BIICL 2009) (concerning Italy in 
particular). 
 11  Giacinto Della Cananea, Beyond the State:  The Europeanization and 
Globalization of Procedural Administrative Law, in EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 562, 566 (2003). 
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took effect in the individual case and the work of civil servants acquired 
significance for the legal system.”12 
We come almost full circle:  from the people to the Nation, from the 
Nation to the State and its organs, from the State organs to the bureaucracy, 
that is some people governing the people. As has been remarked, “Both 
administrative systems and administrative law developed in the specific 
context of the nation-state.”13 
On the European Continent this model replaced—and in 
revolutionary era France, it was much determined to do away with14—a very 
different world, one which was very much articulated, where many different 
kinds of institutions claimed particles of sovereignty and often took over the 
provision of services (especially social services).15 French State ideology 
held a wide swath, as it deeply influenced most of continental Europe over 
the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century and beyond. Even 
socialist States could be seen as—not peculiarly benevolent—developments 
of the potential omnipotence of the State.16  
The pattern change was, however, less marked in common law 
jurisdictions and possibly in some of the Scandinavian countries. U.S. 
administrative law in particular has followed an original path, which is not 
easy to plot exactly.17 Quite briefly and not considering the active role played 
by the political parties in the administration,18 one could say that, federal to 
the bones, the U.S. administration has never had nor claimed a tradition 
régalienne the like of that of centralist France (the English has “kingly,” but 
the French is here much more evocative),19 and anyway there have always 
                                                 
 12  Bignami, supra note 6, at 867. 
 13  Sabino Cassese, The Rise of the Administrative State in Europe, in RIVISTA 
TRIMESTRALE DIRITTO PUBBLICO 981 (2010). 
 14  “Il n’y a plus ni noblesse, ni pairie, ni distinctions héréditaires, ni distinctions 
d’ordre, ni régime féodal, ni justice patrimoniales, ni aucun des titres, dénominations et 
prérogatives qui en dérivaient, ni aucun ordre de chevalerie, ni aucune des corporations ou 
décorations pour lesquelles on exigeait des preuves de noblesse, ou qui supposaient des 
distinctions de naissance, ni aucune autre supériorité que celle des fonctionnaires publics 
dans l’exercice de leur fonctions. Il n’y plus ni vénalité ni hérédité d’aucun office public. Il 
n’y plus pour aucune partie de la Nation, ni pour  aucun individu, aucun privilège, ni 
exception au droit commun de tous les Français. Il n’y a plus ni jurandes, ni corporations de 
professions, art et métiers. La loi ne  reconnaît plus ni voeux religieux, ni aucun autre 
engagement qui serait  contraire au droit naturel ou à la Constitution.” 
 15   See PAULO GROSSI, L’ORDINE GIURIDICO MEDIEVALE 75 (Laterza 1995). 
 16  O.S. Ioffe, Administrative Law in the Soviet Legal System:  Concluding 
Remarks, in SOVIET ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:  THEORY AND POLICY 499, 506 (George Ginsburg 
ed., Nijhoff 1989) (stressing the relevance of administrative law in the Soviet State). 
 17  Bignami, supra note 6, at 863 (stressing the analogies between the French and 
United States experiences). 
 18  See Larry S. Luton, Administrative State and Society:  A Case Study of the 
United States of America, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 172 (B. Guy Peters and 
Jon Pierre eds., Sage 2003). 
 19  The French-like model was appropriate for fairly authoritarian systems, too. 
See Mattarella, supra note 7, at 910. 
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been powerful forces opposing the concentration of administrative power.20 
The model for U.S. administrative law has traditionally been the 
businessman much more than the lawyer.21 Legality and authority were 
always less a concern than in Continental Europe; when, thanks to the 
intense judicialization of U.S. administrative action, the law crept back to the 
center of the stage, the aim became to protect individuals and everyone else 
concerned by administrative actions through due procedures.22 
The U.S. administrative law tradition has obviously held a large 
influence on the administrative reform having taken place in Europe since 
the late 1970s. These reforms have made a big dent in, even if they have not 
disposed of, the French model of the administrative State. In brief: 
 
The main reasons for promoting administrative reform were 
the rediscovery, affirmation, and diffusion of markets and 
consumer advocacy. The user is no longer an administré, but 
a customer who has to be satisfied. Thanks to the free 
market philosophy, administrative reforms have changed 
from being policies involving the public sector internally to 
interventions aimed at improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of services for citizens.23 
 
In this framework of reforms centered on the citizen rather than on the State, 
it is no surprise that the U.S. anticipated a development “towards increased 
                                                 
 20  See A. Roberts, Harris’ Mirage:  The Positive Service State, in PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW 70 (2010) (referencing a specific historical figure). 
 21  See Luton, supra note 18, at 172. The 1883 civil service reform strived to avoid 
the feeling of the coming back of a “gentlemanly government”:  The Civil Service 
Commission pointedly described the examinations that were required for civil service 
positions as practical in nature and pitched at a modest intellectual level, not aimed at 
establishing a college-trained aristocracy. In adopting a civil service system, the United States 
was participating in an international trend towards a merit system; but in the United States 
such a system was a direct challenge to patronage and rotation. The patronage system had lost 
favor because of its participation in the general decline in morality found throughout 
American society. Still, to succeed, the merit system had to offer more than a return to 
morality—it had to offer new values that could counter patronage’s claims to democracy and 
responsiveness. Merit’s new values were derived from business—economy, efficiency, and the 
ability to deal with the increasingly complex affairs of an industrial and urban society. 
Suspicion against professionals, something unthinkable in most of Europe, still pops up in the 
U.S. literature. See, e.g., Martin Shapiro, Administrative Law Unbounded:  Reflections on 
Government and Governance, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 370 (2001). 
 22  Id. at 369 (describing a U.S. administration previously bound by the “the 
citizens to whom administrators owe legally correct substantive and procedural action”). 
 23  Cassese, supra note 13, at 1004; see also B. Guy Peters & Jon Pierre, 
Introduction:  The Role of Public Administration in Governing, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION 1, 3 (B. Guy Peters & Jon Pierre eds., Sage 2003) (“With some exaggeration 
it could be argued that while previously that legitimacy was derived from the public and legal 
nature of the public administration, legitimacy is currently to an increasing extent contingent 
on the bureaucracy’s ability to deliver customer-attuned services swiftly and accurately.”). 
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transparency and participation in government decision making as a means of 
achieving a more perfect pluralist society.”24 
In the past decades, the progressive democratization of western 
societies, the growing influence of the U.S. (also due to the collapse of the 
socialist regimes), the financial crisis of the State and its theorization, the 
development of sociological governance theories, all have contributed to 
change dramatically theories of administrative law25 and to stress the role of 
civil society in filling the gaps between the State and the individuals.26 In 
particular, through governance theories “everyone, or at least potentially 
everyone, is also seen as a participant in the collective decision-making 
process.”27 According to a brilliant theoretical model, administrative law is 
today best described as a system of accountability networks, administration 
and civil society being two of the knots in these networks.28 
The evolution of European—and not only European—administrative 
law has meant profound changes both to its bases and in the ways at which 
decisions are arrived. The change has blurred the boundary between the 
citizen and the State, with civil society often assuming a pivotal role between 
the two. 
Traditionally, collective decisions had to pass through 
national Parliaments:  the legislature enacted statutes 
establishing administrative goals, assigning tasks and setting 
forth procedures. The administrative machinery was then 
summoned to implement them. The legitimacy of 
administrative bodies resulted from their implementation of 
laws. Legality thus also meant legitimacy. This is now only 
partially true. Direct social pressures on the administrative 
machinery have become stronger and stronger. The 
machinery of government has opened up to these pressures. 
For example, we can examine the emergence of 
participatory rights. Administrative authorities no longer 
make their decisions in solitude. They inform the addressees 
of their prospective decisions. They discuss their draft 
decisions with them. Only at the end of such procedures, do 
they take their decision. Legitimacy through the Parliament 
                                                 
 24  Shapiro, supra note 21, at 376; id. at 372 (providing a critical reference to this 
development of a pluralist democracy). 
 25  See Bignami, supra note 6, at 860 (reflecting the dramatic change of 
administrative law theories). 
 26  See Fabio Rugge, Administrative Traditions in Western Europe, in HANDBOOK 
OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 113, 123 (B. Guy Peters & Jon Pierre eds., Sage 2003) 
(describing the relevance of democratization); Keating, supra note 2, at 10 (outlining the 
general trends reshaping governance discourse in Europe). 
 27  Shapiro, supra note 21, at 369. 
 28  Bignami, supra note 6, at 872. 
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is not enough. There is another type of legitimacy, 
“Legitimation durch Verfahren.”29 
 
So much so that “the very distinction between governmental and 
nongovernmental has become blurred, since the real decision-making process 
now continually involves, and combines, public and private actors.”30 Seen 
from a different angle, “[b]lending State and society means that public 
administrators must become more adept at bargaining and governing through 
instruments such as contracts, rather than depending upon direct authority to 
achieve the ends of government.”31 Public administration is no longer the 
oracle of the “general interest”; it is a mediator of conflicts, a facilitator of 
debate, a midwife of consensus.32 
Of course, CSOs, more than individuals, are keen to take part in 
decision-making processes, advocacy being one of their raisons d’être. 
Knowledge and passion, the usual tickets for participation,33 inevitably 
become more compelling once they are vested in an organization specifically 
established to more effectively pursue them.34 In this context, the E.U. faces 
specific problems. Representative democratic institutions are slowly 
asserting themselves, but there is the feeling that accrued civil society 
participation will strengthen the legitimacy of the whole E.U. construction.35 
 
III.  AN ELUSIVE DEFINITION 
 
It would clearly be preferable to provide an intensional or coactive 
definition of “civil society.” However, there are a number of definitions used 
in different contexts and disciplines. At times, civil society is opposed to the 
State; its organizations are then called non-governmental organizations 
(“NGOs”). Other times, it is the space between the State and the market; in 
                                                 
 29  Cassese, supra note 13, at 1006; see also F. WERNER, LEGITIMATION DURCH 
VERFAHREN (Suhrkamp 2001). 
 30  Shapiro, supra note 21, at 370. 
 31  Peters & Pierre, supra note 23, at 4. 
 32  See Daniela Obradovic & Jose M. Alonso Vizcaino, Good governance 
requirements concerning the participation of interest groups in EU consultations, 43 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1049, 1050 (2006) (referring to the E.U. Commission as a “policy 
entrepreneur, collecting views and recommending policies for action”); see also id. at 1053 
(referring to the idea that public institutions “arbitrate between competing claims”); Jeffrey S. 
Lubbers, Achieving Policymaking Consensus:  The (Unfortunate) Waning of Negotiated 
Rulemaking, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 987, 987 (2008) (describing the U.S. experience of regulated 
negotiations); Shapiro, supra note 21, at 372. 
 33  See id. at 374. 
 34  This is certainly the case in the E.U. See Luis Bouza García, Can segmented 
public foster a general public sphere in the EU? An example from the consultation practices 
of the European Commission, 9 OBSERVATORIO J. 169, 171 (2009) (“[C]itizens’ individual 
participation in the European public space is not strong and . . . it is organized groups which 
play a main role.”). 
 35  Olivier De Schutter, Europe in Search of its Civil Society, 8 EUR. L.J. 198, 198 
(2002). 
9
Caranta: Civil Society Organizations
Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2013
48 HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1 
this case, the not-for-profit label is often preferred. At times individual 
citizens are considered to be part of the civil society; other times a meta-
individual organization is required.36 
As already remarked, the paradigmatic model of the nation State was 
very much bipolar. As is often the case, the paradigm implied a drastic 
simplification of actual social relations while simultaneously forcing it upon 
reality to conform it to the abstract pattern. The progressive democratization 
of the nation State along with other changes already mentioned has seen the 
growth in relevance of actors different from both the State and the individual 
citizens (or families, but in the nineteenth century and for most of the 
twentieth century, the difference had limited relevance). The paradigm has 
become untenable, and to find the place of civil society in administrative law 
has become a necessity. 
This area between the State and the individual citizens is where this 
paper intends to dwell, with an additional qualification. The organizations 
considered here will be those pursuing—or purportedly pursuing—general 
interests as opposed to commercial or profit oriented interests. The latter are 
a well know fixture of law and do not present specific problems in 
administrative law. Indeed, in administrative law, corporations or companies 
are treated the same as individual citizens, enjoying participatory rights when 
their individual interest is at stake. Having said so, a caveat is needed. Once 
we abandon the idea that the general interest is what is considered as such 
through the legislative process, many organizations (and even individuals) 
will lay claims as bearers of some general interest. This is the case with trade 
unions and may also be the case with industry associations, both often 
portraying themselves as standard bearers of societal and economic 
development. The role of such associations will be considered here, as well. 
Although their members might be corporations or companies, they do not 
directly pursue profit-oriented interests. As is the case with, for instance, 
trade unions or environmental associations, they pursue the interests of their 
associates claiming a parcel of the general interest.37 
In sum, the focus here will be on those a) organizations which b) are 
not public, in the sense that they are not part of the State or treated as an 
articulation of it, and this c) independently from their being c1) motivated by 
some high (or less so) ideals, or c2) rather business- or professionally-
oriented, or simply c3) not for profit; d) natural and legal persons pursuing 
their individual interests will instead fall out of the scope of the research. 
More or less, the idea is to consider the space between the State and 
individuals (including firms therein). Organization will be an important 
                                                 
 36  See also Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue - General 
principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission, at 
6, COM (2002) 704 final (Nov. 12, 2002); see infra note 38 and accompanying text 
(discussing the approach engrained in Communications from the Commission). 
 37  See De Schutter, supra note 35, at 204 (detailing a different structure of civil 
society participation). 
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element, but the pursuit of a meta-individual interest would be required as 
well.38  
It should be noted that we are not thus trying to give a definition of 
“civil society” suitable for every circumstance. And again, the above does 
not mean that some of the questions raised when considering the role of civil 
society are completely different from those raised in the relationships and 
exchanges between the State and individuals (here, covering both citizens 
and corporations or companies, and natural and legal persons). Only when 
there is an organization is it easier for it to lay a claim as the bearer of a 
particle of the general interest, and maybe of sovereignty. This is why, it is 
believed, civil society either poses specific questions or gives a special twist 
to questions which normally are raised in administrative law. 
 
IV.  WHAT DO CSOS DO? 
 
Basically, CSOs may be involved in both policy formulation and 
policy delivery. The distinction is obviously a logical one. One thing is the 
decision to build a school, it is another thing to have it built and classes 
started. In practice, there may often be a certain continuum. For instance, an 
administrative decision implementing a regulation may be both policy 
formulation and delivery, depending on the amount of discretion left to the 
decision-maker and on whether, and to what extent, the decision will have 
the force of a precedent. 
Of more relevance here is, therefore, the distinction between, on the 
one hand, the adoption of legally bindings measures (including both 
regulatory measures and individual decisions), and, on the other hand, the 
actual provision of material services (even if it has to be admitted that in 
some jurisdictions the latter too might be read as implying the adoption of 
legally binding measures; for example, the decision to admit a patient to 
benefit from the National Health Service). The relevant services will be 
offerings to the general public or, and more often, to a section thereof or to 
individuals. 
Basically, as it is shown, the 1998 Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice 
in Environmental Matters, better known as the Aarhus Convention,39 
                                                 
 38  See supra note 36 and accompanying text (describing the more inclusive 
approach taken by the Commission in that it also covers economic operators not generally 
considered to be “third sector” or NGOs). This might make sense since the Communication is 
concerned with all possible participants to consultations organized by the Commission, and 
obviously large companies and corporations can here play a role; moreover, everyone, 
including individuals, may take part in these consultations, so that for the Commission civil 
society is short for anything which is neither E.U. institutions or member States. The focus is 
obviously narrower here. 
 39  See generally UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, 
http://www.unece.org/environmental-policy/treaties/public-participation/aarhus-
convention.html; see ÁINE RYALL, EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL PROTECTION AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
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involving CSOs in decision-making processes entails a combination of three 
rights, namely access to information, participatory rights during the 
procedure, and access to justice.40 
 Right of access to information is obviously relevant not just as a 
precondition to meaningful participation, but as an enabler for CSOs 
operating as monitors of the activities of public institutions. However, the 
right of access hardly poses specific questions concerning the role of CSOs. 
Right of access is again relevant when we think to the monitoring role of 
CSOs; CSOs have an important place in the transparency and accountability 
mechanisms of governance in that, unlike individual citizens, they have the 
time and resources to oversee and investigate public and private activities 
and to blow the whistle on wrongdoings, which in administrative law 
parlance would be considered cases of maladministration.41 It has, however, 
to be remarked that the possible role of CSOs with reference to policy 
monitoring is not in the end different from the role of, for instance, media. 
Unsurprisingly, some of the most relevant cases on right to access decided by 
the European courts of what is now the E.U. were brought by a news outlet 
and by an environmental organization, respectively.42 
Access to justice and the remedies available are a discreet theme by 
themselves and will not be discussed in much detail here.43 In fact, as E.U. 
law stands today, private litigants including CSOs will not normally (and 
unless they show that their position is directly concerned) be granted 
standing in the E.U. courts to challenge E.U. provisions adopted without 
their participation or without taking into account due account their 
participatory contribution.44 As will be seen, the situation is different under 
the Aarhus Convention.45 
The main focus here is on participation in decision-making 
procedures and what is relevant is that bundle of rules which in different 
jurisdiction go under the label of fair hearing, due process or something 
                                                                                                                   
IMPACT ASSESSMENT DIRECTIVE IN IRELAND 49 (Hart 2009); B. Dalle, Instruments of a 
Universal Toolbook or Gadgets of Domestic Administration? The Aarhus Convention and 
Global Governance, in RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DIRITTO PUBBLICO 34 (2008). 
 40  A similar assessment would be granted on the basis of the U.S. Administrative 
Procedure Act. See Rubin, supra note 5, at 100. 
 41  See KENNETH CLINTON WHEARE, MALADMINISTRATION AND ITS REMEDIES 6 
(Stevens & Sons 1973). 
 42  Case T-194/94, Carvel & Guardian Newspapers v. Council, 1995 E.C.R. II-
2765 (noting that Carvel was a journalist working with U.K. newspaper The Guardian); Case 
T-264/04, WWF UK v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-911. 
 43  See, e.g., Case C-115/09, BUND, Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen eV v. 
Bezirksregierung Arnsberg, Trianel Kohlekraftwerk Lünen GmbH & Co KG, 2011 E.C.R. I-; 
Case C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v. Ministerstvo životného prostredia 
Slovenskej republiky, 2011 E.C.R. I-; Case C-263/08, DLV, 2009 E.C.R. I-9967. 
 44  Case C-263/02 P, Comm’n v. Jégo-Quéré, 2002 E.C.R. I-3425. 
 45  See also Ryall, supra note 39, at 59. 
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similar.46 Participation may come under many different guises.47 
Participation of the potential addressee in decisions infringing on his or her 
property or another legal entitlement is different from participation as 
consultation of the stakeholders,48 which in turn is deeply different from 
taking part in the decision-making process and being able to negotiate its 
outcome.49 Defense, consultation, and negotiation leading to co-regulation or 
co-decision50 are three very different kinds of participation, indeed.51 
 Coming to policy delivery, CSOs may be involved in many different 
ways, namely either being the ones that actually provide the services or 
simply monitoring how the services are provided by the public sector. The 
latter is obviously relevant, and CSOs are coupled here with the media in 
raising the awareness of the general public regarding possible cases of 
maladministration. From the point of view of administrative law, this form of 
involvement does not, however, raise specific problems going beyond the 
general questions of right of access to information and right of access to 
courts. The focus, therefore, will be on CSOs delivering services to the 
general public or, and more often, to a section thereof, or to individuals. 
 
V.  PROCEDURAL AND PARTICIPATORY ISSUES 
 
A. Participation in Proceedings for the Adoption of Legally Individual 
Binding Measures (and Judicial Protection Against the Same Measures) 
 
In a number of common law jurisdictions, the right to take part in 
administrative proceedings—normally proceedings for the adoption of 
individual decisions—developed from the principle of fair hearing. As such, 
                                                 
 46  See Sérvulo Correia, Administrative Due or Fair Process:  Different Paths in 
the Evolutionary Formation of a Global Principle and of a Global Right, in VALUES IN 
GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 313 (G. Antony et al. eds., Hart 2011) (providing a 
comparative assessment of different traditions). 
 47  See also Francesca Bignami, Three Generations of Participation Rights in 
European Administrative Proceedings, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 61 (2005) 
(referencing specifically the evolution of E.U. law). 
 48  L. Azoulai, Le principe de bonne administration, in DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 
EUROPÉEN 493, 502 (J.M. Auby & J. Dutheil de La Rochèreeds. eds., Bruylant 2007). 
 49  See e.g., Cristoph Möllers, European Governance:  Meaning and Value of a 
Concept, 43 COMMON MKT L. REV. 313, 321 (2006) (providing that participation is at times 
equated with consultation, but it is not necessarily so, because the latter kind of participation 
could be considered “strong” participation, quite close to self- or direct government). 
 50  See Paul Verbruggen, Does Co-Regulation Strengthen EU Legitimacy?, 15 
EUR. L.J. 425, 425 (2009) (“In general terms, co-regulation can be described as a regulation 
method that includes the participation of both private and public actors in the regulation of 
specific interests and objectives. As such, co-regulation brings together private and public 
actors in the different stages of the regulation process.”). 
 51  See L. Betten, The Democratic Deficit of Participatory Democracy in 
Community Social Policy, 23 EUR. L. REV. 20, 29 (1998) (describing the difference between 
consultation and negotiation). 
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its primary beneficiary was the person who could be affected by the decision 
under consideration (participation as defense). 
 In the E.U., participation as defense is safeguarded to a fairly high 
degree, as can be evinced from Kadi, a case in which the Court of Justice 
referred to the constitutional role of the judicature to demonstrate the 
necessity to submit to judicial review anti-terrorism measures (including the 
freezing of funds) taken in pursuance of a resolution by the United Nations 
Security Council.52 The measure taken was then quashed because of a blatant 
breach of the right to fair hearing; the Court of Justice did not need to put in 
practice its indications as to the proper standard of review.53 
 Kadi has been followed a number of times. In the Melli Bank case 
(concerning the freezing of funds belonging to a bank established in the 
United Kingdom and controlled by an Iranian credit institution involved in 
that country’s nuclear program),54 the then court of first instance held that the 
courts “must also ensure that the right to a fair hearing is observed and that 
the requirement of a statement of reasons is satisfied and also, where 
applicable, that the overriding considerations relied on exceptionally by the 
Council in disregarding those rights are well founded.”55 
These days, participation as defense is generally granted in the 
E.U.,56 in part because it is referred to in the provision of Article 41 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, now having the same standing as the 
Treaties.57 According to the Court of Justice: 
 
[O]bservance of the right to be heard is, in all proceedings 
initiated against a person which are liable to culminate in a 
measure adversely affecting that person, a fundamental 
principle of Community law which must be guaranteed even 
in the absence of any rules governing the proceedings in 
question . . . . That principle requires that the addressees of 
                                                 
 52  Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat Int. Found. v. 
Council, 2008 E.C.R. I-3649; see also F. Fabbrini, Silent enim leges inter arma? La Corte 
Suprema degli Stati Uniti e la Corte di Giustizia europea nella lotta al terrorismo, RIVISTA 
TRIMESTRALE DIRITTO PUBBLICO 533, 591 (2009) (analyzing the parallel developments of U.S. 
and E.U. case law on anti-terrorism). 
 53  See Giacinto della Cananea, Global Security and Procedural Due Process of 
Law between the United Nations and the European Union, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 511, 516 
(2009) (“[T]he situation of Kadi was a reminder of Kafka’s nightmare of a process in which 
the individual ignores the charges and is deprived of ordinary process rights.”). 
 54  Joined Cases T-246/08 & T-332/08, Melli Bank v. Council, 2009 E.C.R. II-
2629. 
 55  Id. 
 56  See Roberto Caranta, Evolving Patterns and Change in the EU Governance 
and their Consequences on Judicial Protection, in TRADITION AND CHANGE IN EUROPEAN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 15 (Roberto Caranta & Anna Gerbrandy eds., Europa Law Publishing 
2011). 
 57  See generally JILL WAKEFIELD, THE RIGHT TO GOOD ADMINISTRATION (Wolters 
Kluwer Law & Business 2007). 
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decisions which significantly affect their interests should be 
placed in a position in which they may effectively make 
known their views.58 
 
More than that, participation as defense is considered one of the pillars of 
global administrative law; participation is the body of basic rules which are 
followed by supranational and transnational institutions, such as the panel of 
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).59 
 Participation as defense may however pose some special challenges 
to CSOs. Fair hearing and similar notions were developed for the defense of 
freedom and property. They are part and parcel of the mechanism of the legal 
individualist thinking developing from the Age of Reason. Individualism is 
not referred to here with the same meaning ascribed to it in current law and 
economic analysis.60 We refer instead to the nineteenth century idea that 
rights are bestowed to and enjoyed by individuals—natural and legal 
persons, i.e. men, women, and companies, or corporations—rather than by 
communities, such as families, trade and craftsmen guilds, religious orders, 
and chapters of the Church or churches as was the case during the Middle 
Age. It is well known that, in the past, even animals were at times considered 
as holders of rights (mainly defense rights in criminal cases).61 
The focus on individuals only having individual rights was 
compatible with the idea that the State was the entity responsible for looking 
after supra-individual interests deserving to be considered general interests, 
and obviously contributed to reinforce the bipolar character of the modern 
nation States. 
 CSOs may well have individual rights corresponding to this 
meaning, such as property or free speech. The reason for the existence of 
such organizations is, however, normally advocacy on behalf of someone 
else or something else. Trade unions fight for the interest of workers; 
workers may be syndicated, but at times they are not; if the latter is the case, 
it is difficult to maintain that trade unions have a mandate or are agents 
acting on behalf of the workers. Lack of mandate is even more evident in the 
                                                 
 58  Case C-32/95 P, Comm’n v. Lisrestal, 1996 E.C.R. I-5373; see also Case T-
228/02 Organization des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v. Council, 2006 E.C.R. II-4665. 
 59  See Sabino Cassese, Global Administrative Law:  An Introduction, 37 J. INT’L 
L. & POL. 663, 663 (2005); D. Gartner, Beyond the Monopoly of States, 32 U. PASADINA J. 
INT’L L. 595, 617 (2010); Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law:  The Quest for 
Principles and Values, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 187 (2006); della Cananea, supra note 53, at 516 
(specifically addressing the area of global sanctioning measures). 
 60  Robert Ahdieh, Beyond Individualism in Law and Economics, 91 B.U. L. REV. 
43 (2011) (capturing how in that context, individualism is quite a hot topic). 
 61  See, e.g., Katie Sykes, Human Drama, Animal Trials:  What the Medieval 
Animal Trials Can Teach Us About Justice for Animals, in 17 ANIMAL L. REV. 273 (2011) 
(referring to due process). Today the problem of animal rights has come back, taking quite a 
different twist. See also GARY FRANCIONE & ROBERT GARNER, THE ANIMAL RIGHTS DEBATE:  
ABOLITION OR REGULATION? (Columbia University Press 2010). 
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case of CSOs working to promote democracy, human rights, welfare of 
indigenous tribes, animals, the environment, or cultural heritage.62 In the 
latter instances, not only is there no mandate, but there cannot be any, as no 
natural or legal person can claim individual rights with reference to cultural 
heritage. 
The problem is well-illustrated by the Trianel case, decided by the 
Court of Justice (now of the E.U.).63 Trianel Kohlekraftwerk Lünen GmbH & 
Co. KG sought permission to construct and operate a coal-fired power station 
in Lünen in Germany. Within eight kilometers of the project site, there are 
five areas designated as special areas of conservation within the meaning of 
Directive 92/43/EC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna 
and flora, as amended by Directive 2006/105/EC (“the Habitats Directive”). 
The partial permission granted to Trianel was challenged by the Bund für 
Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen 
eV (the Nordrhein-Westfalen branch of Friends of the Earth, Germany; 
“Friends of the Earth”) because of the lack of an environmental impact 
assessment. The German court seized with the action considered that, on the 
basis of domestic law, environmental protection organizations are not 
entitled to rely on infringement of the law for the protection of water and 
nature or on the precautionary principle.  
Under German law, the right of action accorded to non-governmental 
organizations is comparable with that provided for under the general rules of 
administrative procedural law governing actions for annulment and, in 
particular, under §§ 42(2) and 113(1) of the Administrative Court Rules 
(Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung, - VwGO), which provide that an action 
challenging an administrative measure will be admissible only if the 
administrative measure affects the claimant’s rights, that is to say, his 
individual public law rights. The decisive criterion for establishing whether a 
provision of national law protects individual rights is the extent to which that 
provision adequately specifies and delimits the interest or right protected, 
envisages the way in which the right might be regarded as impaired, and 
determines the class of persons protected. According to the court, the rules 
against pollution primarily concern the general public and not the protection 
of individual rights.64 
As we will see, the German court, in turn, seized the Court of Justice 
doubting whether the domestic approach is consistent with the obligations 
flowing from the Aarhus Convention. The situation as described by the 
national court is, however, illustrative of the challenges faced by CSOs when 
trying to make their voices heard in jurisdictions that still adhere to the 
individualistic approach to legal entitlements. 
                                                 
 62  See Anderson, supra note 1, at 844. 
 63  Case C-115/09, BUND, Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen eV v. 
Bezirksregierung Arnsberg, Trianel Kohlekraftwerk Lünen GmbH & Co KG, 2011 E.C.R. I-. 
 64  See id. 
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In considering the position of CSOs, it must be stressed that 
individual administrative decision-making procedures—or adjudication, to 
use a term more current in the U.S.—are quite often polycentric, in that a 
number of individual and supra-individual (including general) interests may 
be involved beyond, and in addition to, the general interest represented by 
the decision-maker and the individual interest that might be directly affected 
by the decision under consideration.65 For instance, the decision to allow the 
building and operation of a factory may involve conflicting environmental 
and economic development interests, the interests of the entrepreneur asking 
for the permission to build, those of the owners of land and houses in the 
proximity (which according to the case, could either benefit from the 
development or see their property lose value), and those of local dwellers 
seeking to protect their health from potential emissions resulting from the 
industrial activities under consideration. 
The fact that administrative disputes are often polycentric obviously 
makes adjudication more complex when compared with civil disputes 
normally opposing just two parties. To this, it is to be added that interests 
involved in administrative disputes might have, and often do have, a different 
relevance and importance. Without necessarily buying into the tyranny of the 
general interest, it is beyond discussion that the general interest is expected 
to override private interest(s) in a number of occasions. That is why taking or 
expropriation is well-known in different jurisdictions. Administrative 
disputes are therefore not only often polycentric; they tend to be 
asymmetric.66 
The polycentric and asymmetric nature of administrative disputes 
does not by itself impact the operation of participation as defense. It however 
stresses the limit of the individualist approach to the law, as some of the 
interests recalled are not individual interests and the State alone could hardly 
be supposed to show the same determination in pursuing with the same vigor 
all the often-conflicting general interests involved. In the instance given 
above, when economic development and the protection of the environment 
are at the loggerheads, the State will have to choose one interest over the 
other, and in so doing the latter risks being defenseless. 
This is particularly true given that an additional factor of complexity 
in administrative disputes is that, in many jurisdictions, the decision-maker is 
vested with wide discretion. This means that the tipping point where one 
interest prevails over the other is not fully defined by the law, as is the case 
                                                 
 65  See Lon L. Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 54 PROC. AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. 1, 1–8 (1960) (introducing the term “polycentric dispute” in administrative sciences). 
 66  The idea of asymmetric disputes is well known to international law and refers 
to issues dividing a rich and a developing State. See, e.g., Klint Alexander, Rethinking 
Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement System:  Leveling the Playing Field For Developing 
Countries in Asymmetric Disputes, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND TRADE IN 
SERVICES (Kern Alexander & Mads Andenas eds., Leiden 2008) 483, 483. In administrative 
law, the idea is different, and turns around on the relevance of different interests. 
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in civil disputes. On the contrary, to a large extent, it is left to the public 
authority to decide which interest is to prevail on the specific circumstance 
of every situation. Often enough in European administrative law, the 
decision-maker is not just a referee between conflicting interests. The 
decision-maker is also a player in the polycentric dispute at hand, in so far as 
it is representing one among the possibly numerous relevant general 
interests. 
Individualism needs to be set aside in administrative law to allow 
CSOs to take the defense of general interests against the State itself. In some 
European countries, individualism has made the life of CSOs—and 
especially of public interest organizations—quite difficult. As already 
recalled, in Germany, CSOs are routinely denied standing to challenge 
administrative decisions, and in the past this was also the case in Italy.67 
To provide a remedy to this situation, in 1998, the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (“UNECE”) has adopted a Convention on 
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access 
to Justice in Environmental Matters, better known as the Aarhus Convention. 
Both the Member States of the E.U. and the E.U. itself have acceded to the 
Convention, which means that, under given conditions we cannot analyze in 
detail here,68 the Convention is now binding on the Member States as a 
matter of E.U. (rather than of international) law.69 Briefly said, this in turn 
means that the Aarhus Convention overrides national rules, and national 
courts are expected to set rules aside to give consequence to the overriding 
direct effect of E.U. law (something that is said to be an effect of the 
primauté (primacy) of E.U. law over national law). As a consequence of this 
primauté, in Trianel, the Court of Justice held that the German rules at issue 
had to be set aside because they basically deprive environmental protection 
organizations of the possibility of verifying compliance with environmental 
rules which, for the most part, address the public interest and not merely the 
protection of the interests of individuals as such; stated otherwise, standing 
“cannot depend on conditions which only other physical or legal persons can 
fulfill, such as the condition of being a more or less close neighbor of an 
installation or of suffering in one way or another the effects of the 
installation’s operation.”70 
The approach in Trianel was followed (with some differences due to 
the technicalities of the direct effect doctrine which do not concern us here) 
in the so-called Brown Bear case.71 Lesoochranáske zoskupenie VLK 
                                                 
 67  Cass., Sez. Un., 8 maggio 1978, n. 2207, in Foro it., 1978, I, 1090. 
 68  See Ryall, supra note 39, at 52. 
 69  Case C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v Ministerstvo životného 
prostredia Slovenskej republiky, 2011 E.C.R. I-. 
 70   Case C-115/09, BUND, Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen eV v. 
Bezirksregierung Arnsberg, Trianel Kohlekraftwerk Lünen GmbH & Co KG, 2011 E.C.R. I-. 
 71  Case C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v Ministerstvo životného 
prostredia Slovenskej republiky, 2011 E.C.R. I-. 
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(“zoskupenie”), an association established in accordance with Slovak law 
whose objective is the protection of the environment, had challenged the 
decision by the Ministry of the Environment of the Slovak Republic to refuse 
the association’s request to be a “party” to the administrative proceedings 
relating to the grant of derogations to the system of protection for species 
such as the brown bear, access to protected countryside areas, or the use of 
chemical substances in such areas. The Court of Justice held that it was the 
responsibility of the national courts to interpret domestic legislation so as to 
enable an environmental protection organization to challenge before a court 
decisions taken following administrative proceedings liable to be contrary to 
E.U. environmental law.72 
To do away with restrictive national takes on the involvement of 
civil society organizations in policy and decision making procedures liable to 
affect the environment, the Aarhus Convention provides a generous 
definition of those involved in the procedures just mentioned. Under Article 
2(4), “The ‘public’ means one or more natural or legal persons, and, in 
accordance with national legislation or practice, their associations, 
organizations or groups.” True, national legislation is referred to here, as is 
the case in Article 2(5), “‘The public concerned’ means the public affected or 
likely to be affected by, or having an interest in, the environmental decision-
making; for the purposes of this definition, non-governmental organizations 
promoting environmental protection and meeting any requirements under 
national law shall be deemed to have an interest.”73 
However, while it is to be conceded that the Aarhus Convention is 
often worded in ways that might appear to be designed to minimize changes 
in domestic law, the case law by the Court of Justice has given the 
Convention and the E.U. provisions adopted to give force to the Convention 
a functional interpretation aimed at strengthening the protection of the 
environment and thus enhancing the standing of NGOs.74 To this end, the 
Court of Justice has referred to the E.U. provision implementing Article 9(2) 
of the Convention, according to which, “[w]hat constitutes a sufficient 
interest and impairment of a right shall be determined in accordance with the 
requirements of national law and consistently with the objective of giving the 
public concerned wide access to justice within the scope of this 
Convention.”75 
As it is clear from its title, the Aarhus Convention also provides for 
participation rights. Articles 6 to 8 concern respectively participation a) in 
decision-making procedures for specific activities (which could be broadly 
                                                 
 72  Id. 
 73  See Ryall, supra note 39, at 55. 
 74  See, e.g., Case C-115/09, BUND, Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen eV v. 
Bezirksregierung Arnsberg, Trianel Kohlekraftwerk Lünen GmbH & Co KG, 2011 E.C.R. I-; 
see also Case C-263/08, DLV, 2009 E.C.R. I-9967. 
 75  Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making 
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, art. 9, June 25, 1998. 
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translated into adjudication), b) in procedures for the adoption of plans, 
programs and policies relating to the environment, and finally c) in 
procedures for the preparation of executive regulations and “generally 
applicable legally binding normative instruments.” 
Article 6, which is of immediate concern here, provides that the 
public concerned—as defined under Article 2(5) analyzed above—must be 
given certain information “early in an environmental decision-making 
procedure, and in an adequate, timely and effective manner.” This 
information covers both the proposed activity and the nature of possible 
decisions (or the draft decision and details as to the procedure which will be 
followed), including opportunities for the public to participate. Participants 
have right of access to the relevant information and may submit, in writing 
or, as appropriate, at a public hearing or inquiry, any comments, information, 
analyses or opinions they consider relevant; the outcome of the public 
participation must be taken into account in the decision which translates in a 
duty to give reasons. 
The Aarhus Convention proves the case arguing that environmental 
law is very much a hotbed for legal innovation, and this is particularly true as 
the involvement of CSOs in decision-making procedures is concerned. It 
remains to be seen how these developments can become general trends in 
administrative law. 
What has been discussed so far is very much participation as 
defense. The fact that the public administration has been transforming into a 
mediator of conflicts, a facilitator of debate, a midwife of consensus, while 
diminishing the asymmetry in administrative law, both increases the need for 
participation and has affected the nature of participation (including the rise of 
cases of participation as co-decision). As the next paragraph will show 
better, if the State takes up the role of umpire, all relevant interests must sit at 
the negotiating table, because those interests not represented will either be 
ignored or trampled upon. 
 
B. Participation in Proceedings for the Adoption of Legally Binding Non-
individual Measures 
 
Numerous general or supra-individual interests, other than a large 
number of individual interests, are normally involved in rule-making or 
similar procedures (as in the case of the adoption of planning instruments). 
By the sheer number of people affected, these procedures affect vast 
interests. Even if both CSOs participation in adjudicatory procedures and 
individual participation in rule-making procedures cannot be ruled out as a 
matter of principle, rule-making or similar procedures have naturally become 
the elective ground for the participation of CSOs. 
Participation rules concerning the adoption of measures having 
general or wide-ranging effects are, however, often less developed than the 
20
Hamline Law Review, Vol. 36 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol36/iss1/4
2013] CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS 59 
 
rules on fair hearing in individual decision-making proceedings.76 To take 
again the Aarhus Convention as an example, Article 7 provides that in the 
adoption of plans and programs relating to the environment, early public 
participation must be allowed; early participation meaning “when all options 
are open and effective public participation can take place.” Moreover, the 
results of participation must be taken into account by the decision-maker. 
Article 7 is however much more stringent as to the information which shall 
be provided to the general public. In addition, concerning the preparation of 
policies, Article 7 is content with prodding the signatories to endeavor to 
provide opportunities for public participation.  
Article 8 on rule-making is somewhat more stringent, providing for a 
basic notice and comment approach open to the public, which should be 
given the opportunity to comment, directly or through representative 
consultative bodies. The latter might well be read as an oblique reference to 
participation as consultation. In rule-making proceedings, as well, we can see 
both instances of participation as defense (in the case of CSOs, this could be 
translated as participation as advocacy or consultation) and participation as 
co-decision (or rather as co-regulation). In both cases, but with an obviously 
accrued relevance in the latter, the most relevant legal questions pertain to 
the definition of who—and more specifically, which—CSOs must be invited 
to take part in the proceedings so that the outcome might be considered as a 
legitimate one. 
In the E.U., the problem surfaced in the context of the European 
social dialogue, a regulatory procedure introduced after the Maastricht 
Treaty and focusing on social policies.77 In essence, the social partners are 
involved in negotiating the content of rules on working conditions.78 Briefly 
said, the Commission promotes the dialogue between European industry and 
workers organizations in view of the possible conclusion of agreements 
between the two sides of industrial relations.79 Agreements may be given 
general binding force by the Council. Otherwise, they are implemented by 
the organizations themselves.80 A big question in this framework is how far 
the organizations concerned may be said to be “representative” of the 
workers. In the context of social dialogue, the Commission employs 
“representativeness” criteria which—as it will be seen—have withstood 
judicial scrutiny in the only case brought to the attention of the E.U. courts.81 
                                                 
 76  See Herwig C.H. Hofmann, Negotiated and non-negotiated administrative 
rule-making:  The example of EC competion policy, 43 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 153, 157 
(2006) (providing a relevant discussion of some relevant E.U. rule-making procedure). 
 77  See Betten, supra note 51, at 29; Verbruggen, supra note 50, at 433; PAUL 
CRAIG, EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 235 (Oxford University Press 2006). 
 78  Catherine Barnard, The Social Partners and the Governance Agenda, 8 EUR. 
PUB. L. 80, 87 (2002). 
 79  Id. at 88. The Commission acts as a “facilitator.” Id. 
 80  This is a general issue regarding NGOs. See De Schutter, supra note 35, at 208. 
 81  Case T-135/96, UEAPME v. Council, 1998 E.C.R. II-2335. 
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UEAPME, an association of small and medium business (or  
“SMEs”), had challenged Directive 96/34/EC on parental leave, adopted by 
the Council following social dialogue between various representative 
organizations, which lead to a framework agreement between three 
horizontal organizations, not including UEAPME. UEAPME claimed it 
should have been associated with the negotiations since it represents the 
specific interests of SMEs.  
The court of first instance remarked that UEAPME was consulted by 
the Commission in the first phase of the procedure, the problem being 
whether all organizations consulted have to be part of the negotiation leading 
to an agreement that is to be given binding force by the Council.82 On the 
basis of the provisions then ruling social dialogue, the court held that it was 
not up to the Commission but to the social organizations themselves to 
choose which social partners had to be involved in the negotiation.83 Stated 
another way, no organization could claim a right to be involved.84 
This approach could be easily criticized as exclusive and possibly 
discriminatory. According to the court, however, before submitting an 
agreement to the Council the Commission is under a duty to assess whether 
the parties to the agreement are representative of the social partners.85 In 
turn, the Council is under a duty to check whether this assessment has been 
duly performed.86 On the substance of the case,87 the court held that both the 
Commission and Council had checked whether the social partners having 
signed the agreement were sufficiently representative,88 and were also correct 
in holding that the constituency represented by UEAPME was anyway 
represented by some of the other more representative organizations having 
signed the agreement concerned.89 
In the end, those who need to be represented at the negotiating table 
are those whose rights and interests are at stake, not necessarily all the CSOs 
that make their business by representing employers, workers or other 
categories. Generally speaking, the approach deserves to be commended, 
since it introduces a measure of competition among CSOs whose claims at 
representativeness cannot just be taken at face value.90 Otherwise stated, 
                                                 
 82  Id. 
 83  Id. 
 84  Id. 
 85  Id. 
 86  Case T-135/96, UEAPME v. Council, 1998 E.C.R. II-2335. 
 87  Inevitably, the all reasoning was framed in legal terms (standing, admissibility, 
etc.). This is described as “convoluted” reasoning. J. Scott & D.M. Trubek, Mind the Gap:  
Law and New Approaches to Governance in the ERU, 8 EUR. L.J. 1, 13 (2002) (framing the 
analysis in governance discourse). It is, however, hard to see how (and why) a court could or 
should reason in non-legal terms. 
 88  Case T-135/96, UEAPME v Council, 1998 E.C.R. II-2335. 
 89  Id.; Anne Meuwese et al., Towards a European Administrative Procedure Act, 
2 REV. EUR. ADMIN. L. 1, 15 (2009). 
 90  See also De Schutter, supra note 35, at 210. 
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since participation, as it will be seen below, entails costs for all involved, it 
might make sense to look for representativeness thresholds, (provided of 
course they are reasonable and do not fight the rationale for participation).91 
The latter proviso was at the heart of another case arising from the 
Aarhus Convention.92 The Municipality of Stockholm had concluded a 
contract with an electric company for works which entailed tampering with 
groundwater. The works were approved by Environmental Chamber of the 
District Court of Stockholm. Djurgården-Lilla Värtans Miljöskyddsförening 
(DLV), a local environmental association challenged the decision. 
A number of questions were referred to the Court of Justice, 
including whether small, locally-established environmental protection 
associations might have a right to participate in the decision-making 
procedures with respect to projects with the potential to significantly affect 
the environment in the area where the association is active, but not have a 
right of appeal. According to the Swedish legislation then in force, only an 
association with at least 2,000 members could bring an appeal against a 
decision adopted in environmental matters. 
The Court of Justice held that, while it is true that E.U. law 
implementing the Aarhus Convention leaves to national legislatures the task 
of determining the conditions that may be required in order for a 
non-governmental organization that promotes environmental protection to 
have a right of appeal under the conditions set out above, those national rules 
must both ensure “wide access to justice” and render effective the provisions 
of the applicable directive on judicial remedies.93 
According to the court, a national law might well require that such an 
association has as its object the protection of nature and the environment.94 
Moreover, “it is conceivable that the condition that an environmental 
protection association must have a minimum number of members may be 
relevant in order to ensure that it does in fact exist and that it is active.” 
However, the number of members required cannot be fixed by national law 
at such a level to run counter to the objective of allowing wide access to the 
courts, taking into account that some projects affect the environment on a 
local scale only.95 The case of the Swedish Government was of course not 
                                                 
 91  It is true that the number of members any organization might have is often a 
crude way to assess the relevance of any CSO; at the same time, the effectiveness assessment 
of the way CSOs operate is not easy, as shown by a massive literature which cannot be 
analysed here. See generally HELMUT ANHEIER ET AL., THE FUTURE OF PARTICIPATORY CIVIL 
SOCIETY ASSESSMENTS:  A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS (United Nations Development Programme 
2011), available at http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/partners/civil_society/ 
publications/tools_and_resource_sheets/CS%20Assessments_Conceptual%20Analysis.pdf. 
The role of CSOs in monitoring the performance of others, such as public institutions or 
private companies, is still another question. 
 92  Case C-263/08, DLV, 2009 E.C.R. I-9967. 
 93  Id. 
 94  Id. 
 95  Id. 
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helped by the fact that only two associations actually have the required 
number of members. The Court also ruled that the requirements of E.U. law 
could not be met by compelling local associations to contact one of those two 
associations and ask them to bring an appeal, since such a system would give 
rise to a filtering of appeals contrary to the spirit of the law.96 This case 
shows that, at times, the question is not only making sure that those who 
participate are sufficiently representative; what is sought is the widest 
participation possible. 
The question of legitimacy might indeed be avoided with reference 
to participation as advocacy or consultation by allowing everyone to express 
their view. This is the approach followed in the E.U. concerning the 
Commission’s legislative proposals. It is to be recalled that under E.U. law as 
it stands now, the Commission has an almost exclusive competence for 
submitting proposals for future legislation. The 2001 White Paper on 
European Governance already stressed the importance of having the civil 
society more involved in policy design, but also more responsible, meaning 
to have the relevant organizations following the principles of good 
governance, which include accountability and openness.97 
To implement this pledge, in 2002, the Commission adopted a 
Communication Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue - 
General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested 
parties by the Commission.98 The Communication lays down a number of 
general principles that should govern its relations with interested parties and 
a set of minimum standards for the Commission’s consultation processes. It 
addresses the specific role of CSOs in stressing that, though the target groups 
of consultations may vary according to the circumstances and all relevant 
interests in society should have an opportunity to express their views, CSOs 
play an important role as facilitators of a broad policy dialogue.99 
The minimum standards for consultations laid down in the 2002 
Communication give detailed indications as to the relevant considerations to 
be taken into account, including the need for specific experience, expertise or 
technical knowledge,100 the track record of participants in previous 
consultations, the need for a proper balance, where relevant, between the 
representatives of social and economic bodies, large and small organizations 
or companies, and wider constituencies (e.g. churches and religious 
                                                 
 96  Id. 
 97  European Governance, at 14, COM (2001) 428 final. A precedent 
characterized by the involvement of the civil society on a scale unheard before was the 
drafting of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. See De Schutter, supra note 35, at 207. 
 98  Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue - General principles 
and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission, supra note 
36. 
 99  Id. at 5. 
 100  See De Schutter, supra note 35, at 207. 
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communities) and specific target groups (e.g. women, the elderly, the 
unemployed, or ethnic minorities).101 
In practice, a draft proposal is published online, often along with a 
number of working documents of the services of the Commissions, including 
impact assessment of regulation analysis;102 public consultations are then 
opened on the “Your voice in Europe” website, which has taken the place of 
CONECCS (Consultation, the European Commission and Civil Society).103 
This intentionally all-inclusive approach has been, so far, quite 
successful in terms of reactions from different sectors of the civil society, 
widely intended, including CSOs.104 For instance, consultations for the 
proposal for a Directive on public procurement and the proposal for a 
Directive on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport 
and postal sectors drew more than 600 respondents.105 It is to be added that 
this inclusive approach is combined with more structured participation 
institutes, including advisory bodies and hearings, and the need for selection 
criteria resurfaces here.106 In practice, the Commission “proceeds to open 
consultation with the general civil society as a preliminary approach, but it 
then moves to much narrower discussion with stakeholders’ organizations 
experts.”107 Moreover, the above does not necessarily apply to all of the 
different measures that make up a multifarious portfolio of more or less hard 
or soft regulatory measures, which can be adopted by the E.U. Commission 
(including guidelines and so on).108 Finally, as it will be stressed again later 
in this paper, the principles and standards referred to here are rather of a soft 
                                                 
 101  Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue - General principles 
and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission, supra note 
36, at 19. 
 102  See Meuwese, supra note 89, at 10. The authors, however, appear to lament the 
very basic nature of the information often provided.  Id. 
 103  See YOUR VOICE IN EUROPE, http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/index _en.htm (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2013). 
 104  Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue - General principles 
and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission, supra note 
36, at 11 (expressly ruling out the option of restricting participation to representative 
European Organizations); see also id. at 16 (referring to an “inclusive approach”); 
De Schutter, supra note 35, at 209 (providing proposals for selecting CSOs). 
 105  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Public Procurement and the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal 
sectors, SEC (2011) 1585 final (Dec. 20, 2011); Public consultations, THE EU SINGLE 
MARKET, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ 
publicprocurement/modernising_rules/consultations/index_en.htm (providing an analysis of 
the participatory contributions). 
 106  Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue - General principles 
and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission, supra note 
36, at 11; see also Meuwese, supra note 89, at 19. 
 107  Bouza García, supra note 34, at 176. 
 108  See Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue - General 
principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission, 
supra note 36, at 10; Hofmann, supra note 76, at 170. 
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law nature. As the law stands up to now, concerned parties, including CSOs, 
do not have standing to challenge either the procedure followed or the rules 
approved.109 
An “everyone welcome,” fully inclusive approach is obviously the 
more difficult to sustain the more impact participation is having. 
Consultations may often be opened to everyone, but this approach just 
cannot work in the case of participation as co-decision. In the latter case, in 
or out choices are to be made.110 
 
C. “Ossification” of Administrative Procedures and Legitimacy through 
Procedure 
 
Beside this, the potential problems linked to participation—and not 
necessarily only the participation of CSOs, even if this is our focus here—are 
inevitably accrued the more rights are given to participants and the more 
duties to take into account participatory contributions are imposed on the 
decision-maker. Or, to word this differently, the magnitude of the problems 
depends on how these rights and duties are construed. The risk, in particular 
according to some current thinking expressed in the American legal 
literature, is that of the “ossification” of procedures. 
Basically, as already recalled, involving CSOs in decision-making 
processes entails a combination of three rights, namely access to information, 
participatory rights during the procedure, and access to justice. By itself, 
right of access to information can hardly lead to ossification of procedure, 
and this is particularly true with the development of internet technologies and 
the process of shifting information from paper to electronic files. Access to 
justice can obviously contribute to ossification since it is the sharpest tool 
available to challenge the final outcome of the procedure, including rising 
procedural issues.111 It has been remarked that the “adversarial atmosphere 
often contributes to the expense and delay associated with regulatory 
proceedings, as parties try to position themselves for the expected 
litigation.”112 
What is however is to be stressed again is that, generally speaking, in 
the present state of E.U. law, private litigants, including CSOs, will not 
normally be granted standing to challenge the E.U. legislative provisions 
adopted without their participation or without taking into due account their 
participatory contribution, unless they show that their position is directly 
                                                 
 109  Case C-263/02 P, Comm’n  v.  Jégo-Quéré, 2002 E.C.R. I-3425; Meuwese, 
supra note 89, at 13 (discussing more recent cases). 
 110  De Schutter, supra note 35, at 211. 
 111  See Case C-115/09, BUND, Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen eV v. 
Bezirksregierung Arnsberg, Trianel Kohlekraftwerk Lünen GmbH & Co KG, 2011 E.C.R. I-; 
Case C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v. Ministerstvo životného prostredia 
Slovenskej republiky, 2011 E.C.R. I-; Case C-263/08, DLV, 2009 E.C.R. I-9967. 
 112  Lubbers, supra note 32, at 991. 
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concerned.113 Again, the focus here is on participation in decision-making 
procedures and what is relevant is that bundle of rules which in different 
jurisdictions go under the label of fair hearing, due process or the like.114 
The right to a fair hearing has a centuries old and noble place in the 
common law. It is often recalled that in 1723, the Court of King’s Bench 
issued mandamus to the University of Cambridge requiring the restoration to 
one Dr. Bentley of the degrees of Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor and Doctor 
of Divinity. Dr. Bentley had been deprived of his degree by the University 
because of some outstanding debts without being granted a hearing. On 
passing judgment for Dr. Bentley, Justice Fortescue famously said: 
 
The laws of God and man both give the party an opportunity 
to make his defense, if he has any. I remember to have heard 
it observed by a very learned man upon such an occasion, 
that even God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam, 
before he was called upon to make his defense.115 
 
This is obviously participation as defense and the word itself is 
repeated twice in few lines. As such, fair hearing was transplanted from the 
law of civil and criminal procedure to what we would call administrative 
law. The fair hearing principle contamination from court procedures to 
administrative ones was obviously helped by the fact that pace Montesquieux 
procedures and functions were no much set apart.116 
Participation as defense has been termed as “first generation 
participation.”117 In the E.U., the right to a hearing initially emerged “in the 
1970s in competition (antitrust) proceedings and was later extended to anti-
dumping and customs proceedings.”118 As already recalled discussing the 
Kadi case, this is a right taken seriously in the E.U.119 
Myth aside, the principle of fair hearing has kept a marked judicial 
characterization, and as such, it was extended to rule-making procedures by 
the United States Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) of 1946. Indeed, 
adjudication, which is the term usually used for what in Europe would be 
considered proceedings for the adoption of individual measure, is a generic 
enough term that can be used to designate a judicial process.120 
                                                 
 113  Case C-263/02 P, Comm’n  v.  Jégo-Quéré, 2002 E.C.R. I-3425. 
 114  See Sérvulo Correia, supra note 42, at 313 (providing a comparative 
assessment of different traditions). 
 115  R. v. Chancellor of the Univ. of Cambridge, (1723) 93 Eng. Rep. 698, 704; see 
also R. v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy, (1923) Eng. Rep. 233. 
 116  Rubin, supra note 5, at 107; Bignami, supra note 6, at 892. 
 117  Bignami, supra note 47, at 61 (classifying participatory rights in successive 
generations). 
 118  See id. at 62. 
 119  See Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05, P Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found., 
2008 E.C.R. I-3649. 
 120  Rubin, supra note 5, at 109. 
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This has not been without criticism. It has been written that the APA 
was already out of date when enacted because of the “advent of the 
administrative State,” which would have demanded “a transition from a 
system of rules elaborated and implemented by the judiciary to a system of 
rules elaborated and implemented by administrative agencies.”121 Of course, 
one could very well consider the APA as a reaction to the New Deal 
legislation and an attempt, quite successful by the way, to reaffirm the 
specific U.S. administrative law tradition.122 In any case, not everyone is so 
critical, and some scholars in Europe view the APA as a possible model for a 
codification of E.U. administrative law.123 
As is well known, formal and informal (“notice and comment”) rule-
making are distinguished in the APA. The former is very seldom used 
because it is considered simply too cumbersome; however, the case law has 
ultimately “judicialized” notice and comment procedures, too.124 This has 
been achieved by taking a hard look at both whether the information 
provided is sufficient and closely scrutinizing the logical and factual basis of 
the rule adopted.125 
For the reasons given above, while process-like rights are 
quintessential to participation as defense in individual decision-making 
procedures, they might easily go beyond the mark, particularly in both the 
cases of rule-making procedures and/or participation as consultation (true 
cases of participation as co-decision are in principle different, since, once 
beyond the question as to the existence of a right to participate, the 
substantive issue of the agreement being reached or not absorbs all 
procedural issues). The U.S. experience shows that participants—including 
CSOs—may easily highjack rule making proceedings when consultations are 
“judicialized” to a high degree.126 
In the U.S., a way out of ossification was in the past sought in 
negotiated regulation, which is in many ways similar to the E.U. social 
                                                 
 121  Rubin, supra note 5, at 96. The author further contends that the APA: 
[I]mposes a number of procedural requirements on the way in which 
administrative agencies may act, these requirements are derived from 
pre-administrative modes of governance, namely rulemaking by the 
legislature and adjudication by judiciary. Even more basically, they are 
derived from an essentially judicial concept of governance in which laws 
are discovered rather than invented and policy making is always 
incremental. 
Id. at 2. 
 122  Meuwese, supra note 89, at 7 (providing further remarks and referencing the 
role of the American Bar Association). 
 123  See, e.g., id. at 3. 
 124  Anna Gerbrandy, Models of Judicial Review:  The search for instances of the 
dialogue-model of judicial review in the USA, in TRADITION AND CHANGE IN EUROPEAN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 15 (Roberto Caranta & Anna Gerbrandy eds., Europa Law Publishing 
2011); Meuwese, supra note 89, at 23. 
 125  Meuwese, supra note 89, at 25. 
 126  Lubbers, supra note 32, at 991. 
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dialogue discussed above.127 Basically, the competent agency calls on all 
concerned parties to meet and negotiate a proposed rule. A neutral mediator 
or facilitator chairs the meetings, which do not abide to the strict adversarial 
rule now imposed on formal adjudication.128 The agency operates somewhat 
on the sidelines; its contacts with the parties are informal and unstructured.129 
However, regulated negotiation has been used less and less, one reason being 
the significant time and costs involved.130 For an outsider, the impression is 
that the U.S. is still trying to find ways to tackle the problems linked to civil 
society involvement in decision-making procedures. 
So far, the E.U. has expressly refused to follow the U.S. example. 
The 2001 White Paper on European Governance recognized only to a limited 
extent the legal relevance of participation and civil dialogue.131 The 
Commission was afraid of strengthening participation too much—as it sees 
it—along the U.S. model, “[c]reating a culture of consultation cannot be 
achieved by legal rules which would create excessive rigidity and risk 
slowing the adoption of particular policies. It should rather be underpinned 
by a code of conduct that sets minimum standards.”132 Indeed, in the White 
Paper “[w]e find little evidence of a shift towards greater involvement of 
non-governmental actors in governing.”133 
Accordingly, the already referred to Communication, Towards a 
reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue – General principles and 
minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission, 
does not lay down legally binding rules (and a communication is not the 
legal instrument apt to this end).134 As already recalled, the idea here is that 
interest groups fulfilling a number of good governance criteria—namely 
representativeness, accountability, and transparency—have the right to be 
                                                 
 127  See Hofmann, supra note 76, at 165 (explaining that instances of negotiated 
rule-making can also occur with the Commission on one side and the Member States on the 
other). 
 128  See Lubbers, supra note 32, at 987. The U.S. adversarial culture, however, is 
ultimately contaminating these kinds of procedures. Id. at 991. 
 129  Id. at 990. 
 130  Id. at 996. 
 131  European Governance, COM (2001) 428 final. 
 132  See Meuwese, supra note 89, at 3; see also Herwig C.H. Hofmann, Seven 
Challenges for EU Administrative Law,  2 REV. EUR. & ADMIN. L. 37, 50 (2009); Kenneth A. 
Armstrong, Rediscovering Civil Society:  The European Union and the White Paper on 
Governance, 8 EUR. L.J. 102, 112 (2002) (discussing the merits of the hard versus soft 
approach to participation). 
 133  See Colin Scott, Governing Without Law or Governing Without Government? 
New-ish Governance and the Legitimacy of the EU, 15 EUR. L.J. 160, 170 (2009); see De 
Schutter, supra note 35, at 201 (writing of “generous, but exceedingly vague, 
recommendations”); see also Armstrong, supra note 132, at 116; Simona Rodriquez, Law-
making and policy formulation:  il  ruolo della società civile nell’Unione europea, in RIVISTA 
TRIMESTRALE DIRITTO PUBBLICO  125, 136 (2010) (referring to the Italian experience); 
 134  European Governance, COM (2002) 704 final; see Silvére Lefevre, 
Interpretative communications and the implementation of Community law at national level, 29 
EUR. L. REV. 808, 808 (2004) (providing communications in E.U. law). 
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consulted.135 Given the difference between participation as consultation and 
participation as negotiation, the preference clearly lies with the former,136 so 
much so that participants do not have a right to receive individual feedback 
from the Commission.137 
What in the end is the most glaring difference between the U.S. and 
the E.U. is that under E.U. law, only participation as defense and 
participation as co-decision in the area of social dialogue gives rise to 
justiciable rights. Participation as consultation does not.138 It has been 
argued, however, that Article 11 of the Treaty on the European Union, in so 
far as it inter alia calls for open, transparent and regular dialogue with 
representative associations and civil society, might provide for an evolution 
in the sense of the legalization of participatory rights.139 
Ossification not being, so far, a relevant risk or foe in Europe, civil 
society participation has been often discussed as a way to strengthen what is 
perceived the fledging legitimacy of E.U. institutions.140 The possible role of 
CSOs in governance has, however, had its fair share of critics, who lament 
the feared demise of traditional representative institutions and criticize the 
perceived lack of legitimacy and accountability of these organizations.141 
These concerns may have some merits, even if it is to be remarked that the 
legitimacy of representative democracy is too often taken for granted.142 
Manifestly, more must be done to shed light on CSOs in the way of 
imposing transparency rules, like the mandatory disclose of funding sources. 
The minimum standards for consultations laid down in the 2002 
Communication already referred to provide a number of relevant indicia.143 
However, what is needed is a transparent arena where CSOs vie to represent 
                                                 
 135  See Obradovic & Vizcaino, supra note 32, at 1049; Nieves Pérez-Solórzano 
Borragán & Stijn Smismans, Representativeness:  A Tool to Structure Interest Intermediation 
in the European Union?, 50 J. COMMON MKT STUD. 403, 403 (2012) (discussing the specific 
topic of representation); De Schutter, supra note 35, at 209. 
 136  See Betten, supra note 51, at 29 (exploring the difference between consultation 
and negotiation). 
 137  See Obradovic & Vizcaino, supra note 32, at 1060. 
 138  See Meuwese, supra note 89, at 3. 
 139  Joana Mendes, Participation and the Role of Law after Lisbon:  A Legal View 
on Article 11 TEU, 48 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1849, 1849 (2011). 
 140  See Scott, supra note 133, at 160; Verbruggen, supra note 50, at 432; Bouza 
García, supra note 34, at 169; Scott & Trubek, supra note 87, at 1; Colin Scott, The 
Governance of the European Union:  The Potential for Multi-Level Control,  8 (2002) EUR. 
L.J. 59, 59 (2002); De Schutter, supra note 35, at 198. 
 141  See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 21, at 372; Sabino Cassese, La partecipazione dei 
privati alle decisioni pubbliche. Saggio di diritto comparator, in RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE 
DIRITTO PUBBLICO 15 (2007). 
 142  See Roberto Caranta, Democracy, Legitimacy and Accountability – is there a 
Common European Theoretical Framework?, in LEGITIMACY IN EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW:  REFORM AND RECONSTRUCTION 175 (Matthias Ruffert ed., Europa Law Publishing 
2011). 
 143  European Governance, at 19, COM (2002) 704 final. 
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and influence, a sort of competitive market for CSOs where information 
about their doings is widely available.144 
 
D. Participation and Lobbying 
 
At least a passing reference is then due to lobbying. In an ideal 
world, lobbying should take place through participatory procedures 
articulated according to the transparency principle. CSOs and other actors 
involved in participation as consultation and participation as co-decision are 
actually pressing their concern through the procedures. Participation could 
thus be seen as “lobbying civilized.”145  
However, in many jurisdictions, actors involved in advocacy and 
pressure groups operate outside the procedures, trying to influence the 
decision-makers, be they bureaucrats or elected officials, including members 
of parliament. Lobbying constantly and easily risks favoring special interests 
if not degenerating into outright corruption. 
The E.U. has taken some steps to try and make sure that this is not 
the case. As already recalled, the 2002 Communication, Towards a 
reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue - General principles and 
minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission, 
lists openness and accountability among the leading principles for 
consultations. The idea is that the “interested parties must themselves operate 
in an environment that is transparent, so that the public is aware of the parties 
involved in the consultation processes and how they conduct themselves.” 
Therefore, information must be provided and published on the website for 
consultation as to which interest the CSOs represent and as to how inclusive 
that representation is. If the information is not provided, submissions will be 
considered as individual contributions.146 
However, the worst abuses in influence peddling take place outside 
formalized consultation procedures. A few years after the 2002 
Communication, the Commission published a Green Paper titled European 
Transparency Initiative, which tries to address these problems.147 Building 
on the 2002 general principles and minimum standard, the Green Paper 
                                                 
 144  De Schutter, supra note 35, at 209 (explaining the necessity of transparency to 
strengthen the representativeness of CSOs); Bignami, supra note 47, at 68 (providing an 
account of the development of the transparency principle in the E.U.). But see Harlow, supra 
note 59, at 199 (providing an example of how transparency is not well received by 
academics). 
 145  See De Schutter, supra note 35, at 217; Bouza García, supra note 34, at 174 
(providing a way for participation and lobbying to be distinguished). 
 146  European Governance, at 17, COM (2002) 704 final. 
 147  European Transparency Initiative, COM (2006) 194 final; see also David 
Coen, Lobbying in the European Union, CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS (2007), 
http://www.eurosfaire.prd.fr/7pc/doc/1211469722_lobbying_eu.pdf. 
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stressed the need to improve the openness and transparency of the operation 
of E.U. institutions.148 
Following the consultations of the Green Paper, the E.U. 
Commission published a new Communication Follow-up to the Green Paper, 
“European Transparency Initiative,” which set up the Register of Interest 
Representatives.149 The Commission has favored a voluntary and incentive-
based approach, meaning that there is no obligation to register, but the 
Commission will combine the Register with a standard template for Internet 
consultations, and those participating in a consultation are systematically 
invited to register. Those registered have to provide information on the 
interests they represent, their mission, and how they are funded.150 A new 
Code of Conduct for the relations with interest representatives was also 
approved; respect for this Code is a condition for both registration and 
permanence of the registration. Basically, interest representatives are 
expected to apply the principles of openness, transparency, honesty and 
integrity, while Members of the Commission and staff are bound by strict 
rules ensuring their impartiality.151 
Finally, last year the E.U. Commission and the E.U. Parliament 
signed an inter-institutional agreement on the establishment of a transparency 
register for organizations and self-employed individuals engaged in E.U. 
policy-making and policy implementation, which basically establishes a 
Register and a Code of Conduct common for lobbying with the two 
institutions.152 Breach of the Code may entail among other measures the 
exclusion of the delinquent organization or individual from the Register and 
the interdiction of access to the European Parliament.153 It is, however, 
evident that while lobbying can be directed through the participatory 
procedures managed by the Commission, the political nature of the 
                                                 
 148  European Transparency Initiative, at 2, COM (2006) 194 final (“The 
Commission believes that high standards of transparency are part of the legitimacy of any 
modern administration. The European public is entitled to expect efficient, accountable and 
service-minded public institutions and that the power and resources entrusted to political and 
public bodies are handled with care and never abused for personal gain.”). 
 149  Follow-up to the Green Paper ‘European Transparency Initiative,’ COM 
(2007) 127 final. 
 150  See also European Transparency Initiative:  A framework for relations with 
interest representatives (Register and Code of Conduct), COM (2008) 323 final, available at 
http://europa.eu/transparency-register/index_en.htm; European Transparency Initiative:  the 
Register of Interest Representative, one year after COM (2009) 612 final. 
 151  European Transparency Initiative:  A framework for relations with interest 
representatives (Register and Code of Conduct), at 6, COM (2008) 323 final. 
 152  Agreement between the European Parliament and the European Commission 
on the establishment of a transparency register for organisations and self-employed 
individuals engaged in EU policy-making and policy implementation, 191 OFFICIAL J. 29 
(2011), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? 
uri=OJ:L:2011:191:0029:01:EN:HTML. 
 153  Id. at art. 18. 
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Parliament makes domesticating lobbies more difficult.154 While the Council 
and the Member States, which through the same Council play a very relevant 
role in E.U. lawmaking, have yet to associate themselves with the European 
Transparency initiative, CSOs make an important portion of registered 
interest representatives.155  
The E.U., as was already plain upon a reading of the Green Paper on 
European Transparency Initiative, has benefited from the U.S. experience of 
regulating lobbies.156 The U.S. experience, which additionally is 
characterized by money-thirsty politicians to an extent without comparison in 
Europe, in turn bears witness to the difficulties in effectively addressing the 
problems of the preferential access the lobbies try to obtain.157 The problem 
obviously is that “Federal and state legislation (even local government 
regulation) can dramatically affect the profitability of any business.”158 What 
can be conclusively said here is that open and transparent participatory 
procedure may be a cure for the worst aspects of lobbying, which itself 
thrives in democratically representative environments.159 
 
E. Global CSOs 
 
The increased role of CSOs is also a result of globalization.160 “The 
influence, reach, presence, and power of . . . international NGOs have grown 
fantastically in the past two decades.”161 The inability of both traditional 
international organizations and of States to effectively address important 
global problems such as the protection of the environment, climate change, 
or the safeguarding of human rights,162 has created a vacuum that CSOs try 
                                                 
 154  See Insight:  Euro MPs exposed in ‘cash-for-laws’ scandal, THE SUNDAY 
TIMES, Mar. 20, 2011, http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/ sto/news/insight/article582604.ece. 
 155  See European Transparency Initiative:  the Register of Interest Representative, 
one year after COM (2009) 612 final; Israel De Jesús Butler, Non-Governmental 
Organisation Participation in the EU Law-Making Process:  The Example of Social Non-
Governmental Organisations at the Commission, Parliament and Council, 14 EUR. L.J. 558 
(2008) (providing an insight on how CSOs penetrate policy making in the E.U.). 
 156  European Transparency Initiative, COM (2006) 194 final. 
 157  Anita S. Krishnakumar, Towards A Madisonian “Interest-Group” Approach 
To Lobbying Regulation, 58 ALA. L. REV. 513 (2007); see also Heidi Reamer Anderson, 
Allocating influence, 3 UTAH L. REV. 683, 705 (2009). 
 158  T. Hearne & A. Blunt, Federal Lobbying Regulation, 3 BLOOMBERG CORP. L.J. 
65 (2008). The authors are more sympathetic to lobbying than academic writers, et pour 
cause. 
 159  Public choice theory has shed light on the role of lobbies and special interests, 
which is unduly ignored by much of constitutional law thinking. See Geoffrey P. Miller, 
Public Choice at the Dawn of the Special Interest State:  The Story of Butter and Margarine, 
77 CALIF. L. REV. 83 (1989). 
 160  L. David Brown et al., Globalization, NGOs and Multi-Sectoral Relations, 1, 2 
(2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=253110 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.253110. 
 161  Anderson, supra note 1, at 842. 
 162  Gartner, supra note 59, at 596. 
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to fill.163 At the same time, new technologies have contributed greatly to 
enabling and empowering advocacy at the global level.164 
Involvement of CSOs has also been sought as a way to strengthen 
the legitimacy of the international organizations and their activities; the well-
known instance of the World Bank shows that the involvement of CSOs can 
lower the risk of poor performance, thus enhancing the effectiveness of 
financial assistance.165 On this stage, too, the role of CSOs has been 
criticized as lacking legitimacy.166 The criticism of opacity and elitism when 
leveled at global CSOs may have merits, but it bites less strongly when one 
considers the traditional lack of transparency in diplomatic negotiations.167 
 
VI.  THE DELIVERY OF SERVICES TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC 
OR SECTIONS THEREOF AND INDIVIDUALS 
 
Managerial reforms in administrative law acting in unison with the 
participatory drive that was analyzed in the previous sections of this work 
have conspired to enhance the role of both the market and the civil society in 
providing services to the general public, or sections thereof, on behalf of the 
State.168 
Having recourse to the E.U. legal jargon, these services may be 
services of general interest (“SGI”), and more specifically services of general 
economic interest (“SGEI”), if the competent authority so decided.169 The 
                                                 
 163  It is submitted that linking the increased role of CSOs on the international stage 
is a consequence of the shift from government to governance. See Shapiro, supra note 21, at 
374. 
 164  David Brown, supra note 160, at 2; see Donald J. Kochan, The Blogosphere 
and the New Pamphleteers, 11 NEXUS L.J. 101 (2006). 
 165  See Gartner, supra note 59, at 611, 626. 
 166  Compare Anderson, supra note 1, at 846, with Gartner, supra note 59, at 599. 
See Harlow, supra note 59, at 198. 
 167  See Shapiro, supra note 21, at 375 (doubting the possibility to transplant 
transparency and participation at the global stage). 
 168  See Gavin Drewry, Law and Administration, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION 258 (B. Guy Peters & J. Pierre eds., Sage 2003) (“In countries that have 
undergone variants of the New Public Management reform, patterns of judicial review (and 
other mechanisms of accountability) have reflected a continuing struggle to keep abreast of 
the changing machinery of state functions and services, and to establish a workable line of 
demarcation between public law per se and private law (including the law of contract and the 
law of tort) as it applies in the context of public functions and state power.”). 
 169  See generally J. Vaquero Cruz, Beyond Competition:  Services of General 
Interest and European Community Law, in EU LAW AND THE WELFARE STATE. IN SEARCH OF 
SOLIDARITY 170 (Gráinne de Búrca ed., Oxford University Press 2005); M. Lombard, 
L’impact du droit communautaire sur les services publics, in DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 
EUROPÉEN 969 (J-M. Auby et J. Dutheil de la Rochère dirr., Bruylant 2007); D. Ritleng, 
L’influence du droit communautaire sur les catégories organiques du droit administratif , in 
DROIT ADMINISTRATIF EUROPEEN 866 (J-M. Auby et J. Dutheil de la Rochère dirr., Bruylant 
2007) ; J. Ziller, Les droits administratifs nationaux:  caractéristiques générales, in DROIT 
ADMINISTRATIF EUROPEEN 546 (J-M. Auby et J. Dutheil de la Rochère dirr., Bruylant 2007). 
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provision of SGEI has been externalized more often than not,170 and CSOs 
may be involved in the delivery of these services.171 In line with a tradition 
of limited or self-government in the U.S., the private, not-for-profit sector is 
also delivering services.172 
The role of CSOs is of course not necessarily limited to the provision 
of SGEI. They may actually provide services that the State or another 
competent authority has not deemed in the general interest and to whose 
provision it does not commit taxpayers’ money, though such services may be 
sought after. 
CSOs may provide services either on a charitable base, using the 
money of donors, or—and this is quite often the case when the service has 
been classed as SGI, implying a duty for the competent public administration 
to make sure that the service is provided (normally) according to the 
principle of the universal service—thanks to financial contributions from the 
same administration. 
The two cases raise different legal questions, even if at times the two 
situations are not well-distinguished, as when some public authority—as is 
often the case in the E.U. and in some of its Member States—is willing to 
distribute public money to strengthen civil society quite independently from 
the provision of any specific service.173 
 
A. Charitable Actions 
 
From the point of view of administrative law, charitable actions by 
CSOs do not pose major problems. No taxpayer money is involved, and 
coordinating the services provided by the public administration with the 
services provided by these organizations simply makes sense. The main 
question is whether, as is the case with investors and consumers, law has a 
role in imposing transparency rules to the benefit of contributors. This 
question is particularly pertinent, and again the analogy with investors is 
appropriate, when considering small donors.174 
                                                 
 170  See generally Catherine Donnelly, The Response of English Public Law to 
Private Actors in Public Governance, in THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE:  POTENTIAL FOR 
TRANSFORMATION? 169 (Matthias Ruffert ed., BIICL 2009); Le esternalizzazioni, (C. Mignone 
et al. eds., Bonomia University Press, 2007). 
 171  See Brown, supra note 160, at 14; Bignami, supra note 6, at 889 (explaining 
how in some jurisdictions, corporate traditions have CSOs, such as trade unions, 
institutionally involved in the management of public sector organizations). 
 172  Luton, supra note 18, at 174. 
 173  See Christine Mahoney & Michael Beckstrand, Following the Money:  
European Union Funding of Civil Society Organizations, 49 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 1339 
(2011). 
 174  This aspect is somewhat linked to the idea of “internal” accountability. See 
Anderson, supra note 1, at 842. But in so far as donors do not have associate status in the 
relevant CSO, it falls rather somewhere between “internal” and “external” accountability. 
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The same kind of rules might, of course, benefit major 
philanthropists. The later, however, normally have the financial clout to 
either create and essentially directly manage their own CSO (just think of the 
Gates Foundation) or to use civil law—including corporate governance 
rules—to take part in the management (or at least to be fully informed of the 
choices made by the CSO) and— more importantly—of the results achieved. 
Philanthropic venture capital is becoming a term of art, even if its actual 
legal configuration still needs to be investigated.175 
 
B. Providing Services for Consideration 
 
Each legal system possesses its own solutions as to how 
public goods are provided. The way they are performed 
depends on how, in one particular system, the distribution of 
functions between public institutions and private entities 
taking part in the management of public duties is legally 
arranged:  this is about the delineation of those public duties 
which must be directly performed by public institutions and 
those which may be partly assumed by private entities; about 
the type of contracts through which part of public tasks can 
be entrusted to private entities; about the recognition of 
something like a ‘third sector’, acting between public 
authorities and the market, and so on. What can also vary is 
the means by which the performance of public goods is 
monitored, assessed, and whether there are legal remedies 
available to those dissatisfied with the quality of the 
provision.176 
 
In the E.U., the Court of Justice has many times stressed that it is the 
responsibility of Member States to decide whether to use their own resources 
and personnel to deliver SGEI or to outsource delivery to the market.177 
                                                 
 175  See ROB JOHN, VENTURE PHILANTHROPY:  THE EVOLUTION OF HIGH 
ENGAGEMENT PHILANTHROPY IN EUROPE, (Alex Nicholls & Rowena Young eds., Oxford 
University 2006), available at www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/skoll/research/ 
Short+papers/Venture+Philanthropy+in+Europe.htm. 
 176  J-B Auby, Public Goods and Global Administrative Law, in VALUES IN 
GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 239, 241(Gordon Antony et al. eds., Hart 2011) (also referring 
to STEPHEN OSBORNE, THE THIRD SECTOR IN EUROPE:  PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES 
(Routledge 2008)). 
 177  See, e.g., Case C-26/03, Stadt Halle, 2005 E.C.R. I-1, at ¶48 (“A public 
authority which is a contracting authority has the possibility of performing the tasks conferred 
on it in the public interest by using its own administrative, technical and other resources, 
without being obliged to call on outside entities not forming part of its own departments.”); 
see also ALBERT SÁNCHEZ GRAELLS, PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND EU COMPETITION RULES, 27, 
232 (Hart 2011); Fotini Avarkioti, The Application of EU Public Procurement Rules to “In-
house” Arrangements, 16 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 22 (2007). 
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With that said, the outsourcing trend has obviously affected the 
provision of services of general interest in Europe as much as in the rest of 
the world. More and more, the market and the third sector are called in to 
provide services of general interest in lieu and on behalf of the State and its 
articulations. Basically, this can be arranged in two ways. The simplest is the 
result of a combination of an accreditation system with fixed amount 
payments. The other is through public procurement procedures, possibly 
including “set aside” mechanisms. Theoretically, it is of course possible to 
think of a third possibility:  direct contracting between the public authority 
responsible for the service provision and a contractor. This approach is 
however neither transparent nor generally speaking efficient, and therefore 
its legality is simply ruled out in the E.U. and in other jurisdictions.178 
The combination of an accreditation system with fixed amount 
payments is, for instance, used in Italy in the framework of the NHS. 
Diagnostic services can be provided by both the NHS itself through its 
structures, such as hospitals and so on, or through accredited private 
providers, which in theory can be managed by both for-profit firms and 
CSOs. It is fair to say that, in the main, this market space is mostly occupied 
by commercial firms—CSOs apparently not being interested or good enough 
at competing in this market. As a consequence, it does not strain reality too 
greatly to assume that CSOs stand a chance in outsourcing services based on 
public procurement only when there is some form of set aside.  
The U.S. is paradise for set aside.179 This includes small businesses, 
women owned small businesses, service disabled veterans, and many 
others.180 In the E.U., the situation is more complex. The non-discrimination 
principle is paramount in public procurement.181 There is, however, the 
problem of the old Sodemare case, in which the Court of Justice held that: 
 
[A] Member State may, in the exercise of the powers it 
retains to organize its social security system, consider that a 
social welfare system of the kind at issue in this case 
necessarily implies, with a view to attaining its objectives, 
                                                 
 178  See, e.g., Case C-119/06, Comm’n v. Italy, 2008 E.C.R. I-168, ¶34; see Adrian 
Brown, Application of the Directives to Contracts to Non-for-profit Organizations and 
Transparency under the EC Treaty:  A Note on Case C-119/06 Commission v Italy’, 17 PUB. 
PROCUREMENT L. REV. NA96 (2008). 
 179  The U.K. ended up aborting a similar evolution. Martin Trybus, Sustainability 
and Value for Money:  Social and Environmental Consideration in United Kingdom Public 
Procurement Law, in THE LAW OF GREEN AND SOCIAL PROCUREMENTS IN EUROPE 262 
(Roberto Caranta & Martin Trybus eds., DJØF 2010); Roberto Caranta & Sara Richetto, 
Sustainable Procurements in Italy: Of Light and Some Shadows, in THE LAW OF GREEN AND 
SOCIAL PROCUREMENTS 147 (2010) (Italy). 
 180  See generally OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING, www.sba.gov/about-
offices-content/1/2986. 
 181  See, e.g., Case C-21/88, Du Pont De Nemours, 1990 E.C.R. I-889; see Sue 
Arrowsmith, The Legality of ‘Secondary’ Procurement Policies under the Treaty of Rome and 
the Works Directive, 1 (1992) PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 408, 410 (1992). 
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that the admission of private operators to that system as 
providers of social welfare services is to be made subject to 
the condition that they are non-profit-making.182 
 
The Commission’s communication on “Implementing the 
Community Lisbon programme:  Social services of general interest in the 
European Union” points to the application of the general public procurement 
rules and principles:  “In such cases, the public body delegating a social 
mission of general interest to an external organization must, at the very least, 
respect the principles of transparency, equal treatment and proportionality. 
Moreover, in certain cases, the public contracts directives impose more 
specific obligations.”183 Moreover, an exception is spelled out in Art. 19 of 
Directive 2004/18/EC, under which “Member States may reserve the right to 
participate in public contract award procedures to sheltered workshops . . . 
where most of the employees concerned are handicapped persons who, by 
reason of the nature or the seriousness of their disabilities, cannot carry on 
occupations under normal conditions.”184 Basically, under E.U. law, there are 
some limited possibilities to set aside contracts for certain kinds of economic 
operators (E.U. jargon for the partners of contracting authorities), which as 
far as social services are considered, could also be CSOs. 
Setting aside, however, cannot be equated with a direct award. 
Competition is restricted to those economic operators belonging to the 
targeted categories, including in some cases CSOs, but competition is still 
present within the category. Award procedure will have to follow the usual 
rules basically centered on the principles of equal treatment and 
transparency.185 
E.U. public procurement law is currently under reconsideration. The 
2011 Green Paper “on the modernisation of EU public procurement policy” 
                                                 
 182  Case C-70/95, Sodemare, 1997 E.C.R. I-3395, at ¶32; see also relativa a la 
aplicación a los servicios de interés económico general y, en particular, a los servicios 
sociales de interés general, de las normas de la Unión Europea en materia de ayudas 
estatales, de contratos públicos y de Mercado Interior, at 4.2.10, SEC (2010) 1545 def (July 
12, 2010). 
 183  Mettre en œuvre le programme communautaire de Lisbonne Les services 
sociaux d'intérêt général dans l'Union européenne, at 2.2.1, COM (2006) 177 final (Apr. 26, 
2006). 
 184  See also Council Directive 2004/17/EC, art. 27, 2004 (L 134/1); CHRISTOPHER 
MCCRUDDEN, BUYING SOCIAL JUSTICE:  EQUALITY, GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT & LEGAL 
CHANGE 4, 56 (Oxford University Press 2007) (outlining the history of sheltered workshops); 
Roberto Caranta, Sustainable Public Procurement in the EU, in THE LAW OF GREEN AND 
SOCIAL PROCUREMENTS IN EUROPE 38 (Roberto Caranta & Martin Trybus eds., DJØF 2010); 
Joel Arnould, Secondary Policies in Public Procurement:  The Innovations of the New 
Directives, 13 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 187, 193 (2004). 
 185  See Roberto Caranta, The Borders of EU Public Procurement Law, in OUTSIDE 
THE EU PROCUREMENT DIRECTIVE – INSIDE THE TREATY? 25 (Dacian Dragos & Roberto 
Caranta eds., DJØF 2012). 
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quotes from the Staff working document already referred to.186 It also 
addresses a question to potential respondents on whether the Directives 
should allow the possibility of reserving contracts involving social services 
to NGOs or whether there should be other privileges for such organisations 
in the context of the award of social services contracts.187 
The proposal for new procurement directives tabled late last year 
provides for both watering down the criteria for qualification of sheltered 
workshops and for special rules for the procurement of social services. 
According to Recital 11 of the proposal, services to the person, such as 
certain social, health, and educational services are provided within a 
particular context that varies widely amongst Member States, due to different 
cultural traditions. A specific regime should therefore be established for 
public contracts for these services, with a higher threshold of EUR 500.000. 
Given the importance of the cultural context and the sensitivity of these 
services, Member States should be given wide discretion to organise the 
selection of service providers in the way they consider most appropriate. The 
proposed rules take account of that imperative, imposing only observance of 
basic principles of transparency and equal treatment and making sure that 
contracting authorities are able to apply specific quality criteria for the 
choice of service providers. Member States and public authorities remain 
free to provide these services themselves or to organise social services in a 
way that does not entail the conclusion of public contracts, for example 
through the mere financing of such services or by granting licences or 
authorisations to all economic operators meeting the conditions established 
beforehand by the contracting authority, without any limits or quotas, 
provided such a system ensures sufficient advertising and complies with the 
principles of transparency and non-discrimination.  
It is remarkable that both the procurement and the accreditation 
options are allowed, but no provision is made for set aside for civil society 
organisations. However, as already recalled, the possibility to reserve 
contracts is widened beyond sheltered workshops for the disabled.188 
Of lately, outsourcing and civil society involvement have taken a 
new and maybe surprising twist. An interesting case is provided by the UK 
Localism Act 2011. The Act implements some aspects of the “Big Society” 
doctrine expounded by David Cameron, the present prime Minister. Part 5 of 
the Act deals with “community empowerment.” Section 81 allows any 
                                                 
 186  On the modernisation of EU public procurement policy Towards a more 
efficient European Procurement Market, at ¶4.4, COM (2011) 15 final (Jan. 27, 2011). 
 187  Id. at Question 97, ¶1.2. 
 188  See proposed new Article 17 (“Member States may reserve the right to 
participate in public procurement procedures to sheltered workshops and economic operators 
whose main aim is the social and professional integration of disabled and disadvantaged 
workers or provide for such contracts to be performed in the context of sheltered employment 
programmes, provided that more than 30% of the employees of those workshops, economic 
operators or programmes are disabled or disadvantaged workers.”). In any case, a call for 
competition is required. 
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relevant body, including voluntary or community bodies, bodies of persons 
or a trust established for charitable purposes only, and parish councils to 
express their interest in providing or assisting in providing a service of 
general interest on behalf of the local authority. Section 81(7) defines a 
“voluntary body” as a body, other than a public or local authority, the 
activities of which are not carried on for profit, while Section 81(8) provides 
that the fact that a body’s activities generate a surplus does not prevent it 
from being a voluntary body so long as that surplus is used for the purposes 
of those activities or invested in the community. Under Section 83(8), the 
relevant authority in deciding about an expression of interest must consider 
whether acceptance of the expression of interest would promote or improve 
the social, economic, or environmental well-being of the authority’s area. 
The need for transparency is attended to in the same Section 83. If 
the authority accepts the expression of interest it must carry out a 
procurement exercise relating to the provision on behalf of the authority of 
the relevant service to which the expression of interest relates (public 
procurement or concession for services); the procurement procedure 
followed must be appropriate, having regard to the value and nature of the 
contract that may be awarded. Since, at present, service concessions are only 
marginally ruled under E.U. and U.K. law (and the same applies to below the 
threshold service procurement contracts), Section 83 further details the rules 
to be followed, including minimum periods for submitting tenders and 
publication of details of the specifications.189 Moreover, under Section 83(9), 
the authority must consider how it might promote or improve the social, 
economic, or environmental well-being of the authority’s area. 
One might easily dismiss the Localism Act as a new ruse to rein in 
public expenses and roll further back the borders of the State, introducing 
new forms of privatization.190 Indeed, the first sections of the Act regulate 
referenda relating to council tax increases and other fiscal matters 
reminiscent of Margaret Thatcher policy to rein in spend-happy (or so 
perceived) local labor councils.191 As we have seen, however, the greater 
involvement of the civil society in delivering public policy is not something 
new, nor necessarily something very right-wing and conservative. 
Already in 2001, against a quite different ideological background—
one marked by a traditionally important involvement of both the Church and 
lay organizations in the provision of social services—the new Article 118 of 
                                                 
 189  See Roberto Caranta, The Borders of EU Public Procurement Law, in OUTSIDE 
THE EU PROCUREMENT DIRECTIVE – INSIDE THE TREATY? 25 (Dacian Dragos & Roberto 
Caranta eds., DJØF 2012). 
 190  See Jay Kennedy, Eric Pickles’ Localism Bill contains a Trojan Horse, THE 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 11, 2011), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/voluntary-sector-
network/2011/feb/11/localism-bill-tojan-horse (referring to the Bill later voted into the 
Localism Act). 
 191  See Eoin Carolan, Legitimising Disaggregated Governance:  Accountability, 
Experimentalism and Democracy in the Big Society, PUB. L. (2012) (forthcoming). 
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the Italian Constitution introduced the idea of horizontal subsidiarity, that is, 
the preferential involvement of CSOs in the provision of those services.192 
At present, Italian law is however somewhat less firm than the 
Localism Act 2011, in holding that civil society involvement must take place 
through open and competitive procurement procedures.193 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
“Theories of administration and administrative law have changed 
dramatically in recent times.”194 
One element of the evolution toward a new paradigm is indeed the 
new relevance of civil society and its organizations. CSOs today play 
important roles in both policy design and policy delivery.195 While in some 
quarters CSOs are seen as upholding the legitimacy of representative 
institutions196—albeit weakly democratic—others lament the lack of 
legitimacy of the CSOs themselves.197 
The most sensible way out of this conundrum seems to be enhancing 
transparency in—and competition among—the CSOs, rather than killing or 
maiming participation.198 Strengthening participation beyond consultations199 
implies the necessity to devise mechanisms to select which CSOs are to 
participate because an “everyone welcome” approach would make decision-
making procedures too cumbersome.200 
In this respect, the E.U. is hindered by the traditions of corporatism. 
In Europe, generally, few large organizations are given privileged access to 
regulatory and administrative proceedings, apart from self-regulating powers. 
The U.S. adversarial—or pluralist—approach, instead, sees many different 
CSOs competing for relevance and influence.201 
The pluralist approach is obviously preferable, in that it makes the 
capture of the CSOs more difficult when compared with cozy corporatist 
arrangements. The point is how the competition can be rendered open and 
fair. Transparency is obviously of paramount importance here, and one 
relevant element in this respect is reputation. As it has been remarked, “Since 
                                                 
 192  See generally Tania Groppi, Italy. The Subsidiarity Principle, 4 INT’L J. CONST. 
L. 131 (2006); A. POGGI, LE AUTONOMIE FUNZIONALI TRA SUSSIDIARIETÀ VERTICALE E 
SUSSIDIARIETÀ ORIZZONTALE (Giuffré 2001). 
 193  See Caranta & Richetto, supra note 179. 
 194  Bignami, supra note 6, at 860. 
 195  See id. at 905 (explaining that the role of CSOs, previously obscured by the 
dominant paradigm of expert administration, has been brought to the light). 
 196  De Schutter, supra note 35, at 198; Bouza García, supra note 34, at 169; 
Caranta, supra note 56, at 15. 
 197  Shapiro, supra note 21, at 372; Casesse, supra note 141, at 15. 
 198  De Schutter, supra note 35, at 209 (explaining the relevance of transparency). 
 199  See Mendes, supra note at 139, at 1849. 
 200  De Schutter, supra note 35, at 209. 
 201  Bignami, supra note 6, at 885. 
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NGOs are particularly vulnerable to threats to their reputations—and because 
they are otherwise fairly weak actors who rely on their credibility for 
influence—reputational concerns can be a powerful accountability 
mechanism.”202 
Moreover, “strictly corporatist models pose significant challenges at 
the international level, in terms of how such organizations would be selected 
and the risk that rigidities could evolve that would exclude emerging 
stakeholders.”203 What plays at the international level will play at regional or 
State level, as well, and here again the reference to competitive market 
concepts (think new entrants, but also incumbents) is manifest.204 
As CSOs contribute to the transparency of governance mechanisms, 
the question of their own transparency is unavoidable. In particular, 
“fiduciary institutions of a nonprofit nature . . . owe obligations of public 
trust.”205 The role of law here is to provide rules which force or at least 
encourage CSOs to disclose data concerning, for instance, membership, 
sources of funding, ways funds are spent, and results achieved.206 In a way, a 
sort of CSO market regulatory framework is necessary for the accountability 
of CSOs both to their members and to the public at large affected by their 
contribution to policy formation.207 
Finally, when, as is the case with the E.U., CSOs are at times seen as 
sources of expertise, rather than “general,” “political,” or “democratic,” 
legitimacy, fair and open competitive selection mechanism are needed, and 
the model here can be the principles and rules of public procurement 
discussed above.208 
                                                 
 202  Gartner, supra note 59, at 603. 
 203  Id. at 633; see also id. at 637. 
 204  See id. at 637 (writing about the risk that “early participants will become 
entrenched in their roles and prevent the involvement of new groups”). 
 205  Anderson, supra note 1, at 842. 
 206  See Helmut Anheier et al., The Future of Participatory Civil Society 
Assessments: A Conceptual Analysis (2011), available at http://www.undp.org/ 
content/dam/undp/documents/partners/civil_society/publications/tools_and_resource_sheets/C
S%20Assessments_Conceptual%20Analysis.pdf. This document was recently drafted for the 
U.N. Development Programme. 
 207  Anderson, supra note 1, at 842. 
 208  See Roberto Caranta, Transparence et concurrence, in DROIT COMPARÉ DES 
CONTRATS PUBLICS. COMPARATIVE LAW ON PUBLIC CONTRACTS 145 (Rozen Noguellou & 
Ulrich Stelkens eds., Bruylant 2010) (providing the relevance of the way transparency and 
competition rhyme in public procurement). 
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